The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor (W W Norton & Company; 1998)

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NOTES^545


  1. Crouzet, De la supériorité, p. 110. Crouzet notes (p. 489, n. 28) that this resent­
    ment of English trade practices is already found in Jacques Savary's commercial man­
    ual, Le parfait négociant (1st ed. 1675). On the other hand, a memorandum of 1711
    states that England went over to heavy protection only after France had set the exam­
    ple and that the English actually traded more fairly [noblement] than other nations.
    One should not take these opinions as more than perceptions.

  2. So Crouzet, tongue-in-cheek, citing a variety of sources, p. 490, n. 31.

  3. Riem, IV, 17.

  4. Mirabeau, p. 47.

  5. Karl Marx, preface to Capital, p. 13. One consequence of this faith in laws was the
    definition of a properly socialist path to development, with strong emphasis on the pri­
    ority of heavy industry—a kind of metallurgical fetishism. (It was no accident that Josef
    Dzhugashvili took Stalin [steel] as his nom de partie)

  6. Although empirical research has long demonstrated the particularities of national
    patterns of development (see, for example, Clapham, Economic Development [1923]),
    the myth of "a single and multilinear model of industrialization based on the English
    experience" remains an irresistible strawman, to be knocked down by successive revi­
    sions of an allegedly conventional wisdom. Thus the wonderful (in more ways than
    one) findings of O'Brien and Keyder, Economic Growth in Britain and France, which
    announced with flourishes that France had found its own "path to the twentieth cen­
    tury." For a critical if indulgent view of these exercises in iconoclasm, see Davis, "In­
    dustrialization in Britain and Europe," pp. 48-54.

  7. This is the sense of Jordi Nadal in his Fracaso de la Revoluciôn industrial en Es-
    pana, which he describes as an "analysis of the causes that limit the attempt to apply
    in Spain the classic model—English style—of economic development."

  8. Good, Economic Rise, pp. 11-12; Kemp, Industrialization, pp. 26-27'. For what
    we would call today a politically correct attack on the bias of such We-centered tem­
    poralities, see Fabian, Time and the Other. Cf. Landes, "Time of Our Lives," p. 719,
    n. 7.

  9. Cf. Domar, "Causes of Slavery or Serfdom."

  10. Cited in Bradley, Guns for the Tsar, p. 132.

  11. Crisp, "Labour and Industrialization in Russia," in Mathias and Postan, eds., The
    Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol. VII, Pt. 2, p. 330. This figure (4 m.) rep­
    resented some 6.5 percent of total population. Small, then, relatively, but large ab­
    solutely.

  12. Some scholars would stress the incompleteness of the emancipation, in particular
    the maintenance of collective village obligations, as the reason for its inefficacy—cf.
    Gerschenkron, "Die Vbrbedingungen," p. 25. As the above text indicates, I would put
    more stress on the effect of freedom on the workforce in industry—those already
    there and those to be recruited.

  13. Report of spring 1859, cited in Hamerow, Social Foundations, p. 120. The phrase
    "prohibitive system" is an allusion to prohibitions on the import of certain manufac­
    tures, particularly cottons, by way of protecting and promoting the local infant in­
    dustry.

  14. By the middle of the 1860s, sixteen states of the German Confederation with 34
    million inhabitants had come under the new dispensation; seven states with 7 million
    people were in the process of transition; and twelve states with only 3.5 million peo­
    ple, most of them agricultural in character, held out for the old order—Hamerow, So­
    cial Foundations, p. 121.

  15. Heckscher, Mercantilism, I, 64.

  16. Heckscher, ibid., 1,72, states that the highest officials connived at this secrecy tac­
    tic; thus the toll director of East Prussia was given the tariff of 1644 with the strict in-

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