The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor (W W Norton & Company; 1998)

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(^552) NOTES



  1. Cf. Batou, Cent ans, p. 223, n. 13, who attributes this concept to Gramsci.

  2. Batou, Cent ans, p. 232, citing A. Garcia Mellid, Proceso a los falsificadores de la
    historia del Paraguay (Buenos Aires, 1963).

  3. Batou, Cent ans, p. 260. By comparison, Batou cites 8-10 percent for Argentina
    in 1865, 10-15 percent for Colombia before 1870, 18-20 percent for Mexico in



  4. As part of this campaign, the rulers and merchant interests in Buenos Aires re­
    peatedly closed the mouth of the Parana river and cut the "Guarani republic" off from
    the sea. See a table of these blockades in Batou, Cent ans, p. 241. By international law,
    which defines a blockade as an act of war, Argentina was at war with Paraguay from
    1827 to 1852.

  5. On these industries, most of them created in the 1850s under the rule of Carlos
    Antonio Lopez, see Batou, Cent ans, ch. 8; Pastore, "State-led Industrialisation";
    Whigham, "Iron Works of Ybycui."

  6. For a pro-Paraguayan point of view, see Batou, Cent ans, pp. 263-66.

  7. See the table assembled by Batou, Cent ans, p. 249, which gives population as
    750,000 in 1865, 230,000 in 1872. Not all scholars agree with these losses, which
    have long been accepted as gospel. Thus Reber, "The Demographics of Paraguay,"
    suggests that the dead in the Great War, rather than more than half the population and
    the great majority of males, may have been as few as 8.7 to 18.5 percent of the pre­
    war population. Others find these revisionist estimates, which are "based on a nonlin­
    ear regression with very few degrees of freedom" (Pastore, "State-led
    industrialisation," p. 296, n. 3), implausible.

  8. Batou, Cent ans, p. 267.


CHAPTER 21


  1. From Welsh, A Borrowed Place, p. 16, who quotes without reference.

  2. On the morning ceremonial, see Landes, Revolution in Time, pp. 51-52; also
    Huang, 1587, a Tear of No Significance.

  3. Nathan Sivin speaks of "a large measure of social stability and cultural homo­
    geneity that left traditional values and forms practically unchallenged as the creativity
    behind them was sapped by intellectual orthodoxies"—"Science and Medicine," in
    Ropp, ed., Heritage of China, p. 166.

  4. Letter to the French minister Colbert, undated but of 1675—Landes, Revolution
    in Time, p. 45.

  5. On this story, see Cipolla, Clocks and Culture; also Landes, Revolution in Time,
    ch. 2.

  6. Spence, Emperor of China, p. 74.

  7. On all of this, the best source is still Cipolla, Guns, Sails, and Empires, especially
    pp. 116-19. Cipolla is not a sinologist and had to rely exclusively on European sources,
    including the testimony of Christian missionaries and travelers; but his "global vision"
    gives him crucial insights that are missing in the specialist literature.

  8. Mu, The Wilting of the Hundred Flowers (New York, 1963), pp. 76-77, cited in
    Cipolla, Guns, Sails, and Empires, p. 120.

  9. Taton, ed., General History, II, 592.

  10. Ibid., 590.

  11. Ibid., 589, n. 1.

  12. This is one of the major contribution's of Alain Peyrefitte's book, L'empire im­
    mobile. Because he gained access to the Chinese archives, including papers read and an­
    notated by the emperor, Peyrefitte can show the inner workings of bureaucratic
    equivocation.

  13. Cipolla, Guns, Sails, and Empires, p. 120 f.

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