Charles Wilson, "Economy and Society," in Payne, "Industrial Entrepreneur-
ship," p. 208.
James Foreman-Peck, "The Balance of Technological Transfers 1870-1914," in
McCloskey and Dormois, eds., "British Industrial 'Decline,' " p. 11, dismisses the
loss as "merely a different pattern of international specialisation." Pollard, Britain's
Prime, ch. 3, sees dyestuffs as small stuff.
Friswell and Levinstein cited in Haber, Chemical Industry, p. 168. (This is just the
kind of witness that the optimists find awkward; so they dismiss it as self-interested.)
The best-known Jews in British chemicals were the managing partners in Brunner,
Mond & Co., the leading firm in alkali manufacture. They brought in the Solvay
process, without effect on the outworn technology of the rest of the industry—except,
that is, to encourage them to shelter themselves behind agreements in restraint of
trade. Brunner, Mond went along and garnered monopoly rents.
Rubinstein, Capitalism, Culture and Decline, pp. 94—96, makes much of British
contributions in pure science, recognized by a disproportionate share of Nobel prizes.
But he says litde about applications, except to agree that most of these "often, now
regularly" found use in other countries. On the electrical industry, where engineer
ing clearly mattered, see Byatt, British Electrical Industry, pp. 188-90: "British busi
ness men were not very good at using their engineers." For a favorable view of
British scientific and technical education, see Edgerton, Science, Technology, especially
ch. 5.
See, among others, Landes, The Unbound Prometheus, ch. 5; and Wiener, English
Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit. Also a passing remark by Habakkuk,
American and British, p. 212: "An Englishman's choice of career was, it is true, very
much influenced by tradition, convention and inertia, and no doubt in England these
tended to channel talent away from business towards the professions." On the other
hand, see Dintenfass, Decline, pp. 61-64.
Cf. Livingston, "Gentieman, Theory of the." This cultivation of superiority to the
material also found expression in the memoirs of British travelers to the United States.
Whereas in the eighteenth century it was England that was the object of criticism or
admiration because of its social mobility and material success, in the nineteenth cen
tury the United States incarnated these virtues and vices and became the object of
scorn and condescension by snobs and fortune hunters alike.
Abramovitz and David, "Convergence and Deferred Catch-up," pp. 26-27. The
sixteen advanced countries grouped for comparison are twelve European leaders: Aus
tria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, plus the U.K.; plus Australia, Canada, and Japan.
Ibid., p. 27, Table 1.
See Steven A. Holmes, "Income Disparity between Poorest and Richest Rises,"
N.T. Times, 20 June 1996, p. A-l. Also Keith Bradsher, "More Evidence: Rich Get
Richer," ibid., 22 June 1996, p. A-31. Paul Krugman, Pop Internationalism, is cutting
in his rejection of those who would argue that the retreat of the United States is linked
to the advance of international competitors. Yet I find a similarity to the earlier in
stances of loss of leadership.
Robert Samuelson, "Is There a Savings Gap?" Newsweek, 17 June 1996, p. 56, cit
ing a study by the McKinsey Global Institute.
Lewchuk, American Technology, p. 117.
Quoted ibid., p. 117. Of the three leading producers in the prewar years, only
Great Britain fell substantially short of home demand. France shipped more than half
its output abroad and was the leading exporter in the world.
Ibid., pp. 171-72.
For a case study in dysfunctional management, going back to the interwar years,
see Church, "Deconstructing Nuffield." On leisure preference, Church notes (p. 572)
