Politics and the judiciary 229give it also the power to assert itself against the executive and legislative
branches, and at times to brave public uproar in defence of constitutional
principles in which they believe. The years since 1954 have been a period in
which the Court has used this institutional power to the full, and from time
to time incurred the deep anger both of the Congress and the president.
Judicial activism and judicial restraint
In the early years of the New Deal the Court actively used its power to block
congressional action on a wide range of matters affecting the economic life of
the nation. In two years, 1935–6, the Court invalidated seven major statutes
that had been intended to deal with the economic problems of the Depres-
sion, and the president’s programme lay in ruins. The attack upon the Court,
and the new appointments made by Roosevelt, led to the dominance of the
philosophy of judicial restraint on the Court until the Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion decision in 1954 ushered in a new era of judicial activism. In view of the
political repercussions of the desegregation decision, the Court might well
have rested on its laurels and not ventured into other controversial areas, but
instead it undertook to innovate in a number of other extremely politically
sensitive fields of constitutional law. Having incensed Southern Senators and
Congressmen, the Court proceeded to anger both conservatives concerned
about the threat of communism, and all those across the country who were
fearful of further federal intrusion into the affairs of the states.
In a series of decisions in 1956 the Court moved further into the field
of civil rights. It held that defendants in criminal cases, against whom FBI
agents had testified, should be given access to the Bureau’s files to enable
them to check for discrepancies between the testimony and the reports upon
which it was based (Jencks v. US). It placed restrictions upon the investiga-
tory powers of congressional committees in a decision specifically directed
at the Un-American Activities Committee of the House of Representatives
(Watkins v. US). The Court reversed the convictions of fourteen leaders of the
Communist Party convicted under the Smith Act that was aimed at persons
conspiring to teach the violent overthrow of the government (Yates v. US).
The Justices freed a university professor who had been convicted under a
New Hampshire law for refusing to answer questions concerning his politi-
cal beliefs (Sweezy v. New Hampshire). Finally, the Court invalidated the laws
of forty-two states directed against subversive activities, on the grounds
that Congress had legislated in that field to the exclusion of state power
(Pennsylvania v. Nelson). In the following year the Court turned its attention to
safeguarding other rights of the individual against the power of government.
It invalidated legislation that revoked the citizenship status of naturalised
citizens who had offended the government (Trop v. Dulles); and it overturned
the decision of the State Department to withhold the passports of those it
wished to prevent from travelling abroad (Kent v. Dulles; Dayton v. Dulles). In a
string of cases the Court invalidated sections of congressional statutes that