The making of American domestic policy 241also proposed that new large purchasing groups be formed, called alliances,
to provide health care.
The proposal was met by a barrage of negative advertisements in the
press and on television, and an onslaught of news stories that left the public
bewildered. The Health Security Bill, embodying the recommendations of
the Task Force, ran to 1,342 pages. The health insurers and the drug com-
panies attacked the Bill, and the confusion was confounded by the way in
which the Congress dealt with the proposal. During the first half of 1994 five
major committees and a host of secondary committees struggled to draft
their own versions of health care reform. Congressional leaders were un-
able to resolve the competition among the congressional committees that
wanted to take charge of the legislation. In the House, the Ways and Means
Committee, the Energy and Commerce Committee, and the Education and
Labor Committee all claimed the right to consider the proposals. Secondary
aspects of the Bill were referred to seven other committees. In the Senate
the Chairmen of the Finance and Labor Committee, Patrick Moynihan, and
the Human Resources Committee, Edward Kennedy, both prominent Demo-
crats, could not agree on which committee should have jurisdiction. Each of
these committees drafted their own alternative Bills, so that there were now
six different versions of the proposed legislation under consideration, the
Clintons’ Bill and the five committee versions. None had enough support to
pass. In an attempt to break the deadlock, House and Senate leaders set out
to draft their own versions of the reform legislation; in late July and August,
the Democratic Leaders in both House and Senate introduced further Bills.
As a result of the complexity of the issue, and the confusion in Congress,
the public was unclear about its attitude to the legislation. The opponents of
the Bill, the health insurers, the drug companies, and the doctors, mounted a
strong campaign in the media. On television a series of short clips portrayed
a middle-class couple – Harry and Louise – perplexed and worried about the
cost and quality of health care if the Clinton plan was passed. Even Clinton’s
supporters had to accept modifications to the grand plan, such as allowing the
health care plans of trade unions to be exempted from the scheme. At this
point the president’s party, the Democrats, had a sizeable majority in both
the House of Representatives and the Senate, but the leader of the Repub-
licans in the Senate, Bob Dole, was more in tune with opinion in the legisla-
ture than was the president. ‘Our country has health-care problems, but not
a health-care crisis,’ he argued. ‘The President’s idea is to put a mountain of
bureaucrats between you and your doctor.’ He proposed ‘common-sense solu-
tions’, piecemeal answers to particular issues, such as a guarantee of uninter-
rupted coverage when moving from one employment to another, and no bar
to coverage due to previous medical conditions. This ‘incremental approach’,
so characteristic of the policy-making process in America, was more attrac-
tive to legislators than the blueprint offered by the Clinton administration.
Towards the end of the 1994 session of Congress, it became clear that there
was no majority for any of the various Bills then under consideration. There