256 The making of American domestic policy
sippi and Alabama, but was never fully implemented in Louisiana. Relations
between federal and state officials in Louisiana were bad. The Governor of
Louisiana blamed FEMA; the Mayor of New Orleans blamed the state and
federal authorities; FEMA officials blamed Louisiana for shortcomings. The
lack of coordination between federal departments and with the National
Guard exacerbated the problem. In 2006 a report by the Inspector General
of the Department of Homeland Security stated that:
Some FEMA officials expressed frustration at the requirement for ap-
proval by the Secretary of Defense before Department of Defense re-
sources could be used in support of a domestic incident response. Of-
ficials indicated the Department of Defense approval process sometimes
required 24 to 48 hours, creating delays for life saving and life sustain-
ing missions. For example, on the evening of August 28, 2005, FEMA
requested Department of Defense assistance to airlift eight California
swift water rescue task forces to Louisiana. Because the Secretary of
Defense must approve such requests, the order approving the airlift was
not signed until August 30, 2005, and the task forces did not begin water
rescue operations in Louisiana until August 31, 2005.The Washington Post reported that the National Disaster Medical team ‘was
summoned late, then sent to Texas instead of Louisiana, then parked in Ba-
ton Rouge for a week while New Orleans suffered. When the team was finally
sent to the disaster zone, it was immediately overwhelmed’. The National
Guard and federal troops were eventually deployed to restore order and to
make relief work possible, but only after a dispute between the Governor
of Louisiana and President Bush about their use. The report of the DHS
Inspector General issued in March 2006 stated: ‘The federal government, in
particular the Federal Emergency Management Agency, received widespread
criticism for a slow and ineffective response to Hurricane Katrina. Much
of the criticism is warranted.’ The report continued: ‘the magnitude of the
storm and its catastrophic effects completely overwhelmed FEMA’s disaster
response system and resources, and those of state and local governments. In
addition, differences in disaster response and emergency management capa-
bilities across states resulted in varied levels of response success.’
Although the magnitude of the disaster that the government had to cope
with should not be underestimated, it is clear that the complexity of the
federal administrative structure, the rivalries between federal agencies and
the difficulties of coordinating the actions of the differing levels of govern-
ment contributed to what one Congressman, Bill Pascrell, called ‘the chilling
consequences of these deficiencies.’
Policy-making in America
Although a set of case studies such as those presented in this chapter can
never be wholly representative of the way in which decisions are made in a