The Dictionary of Human Geography

equilibrium and effortless reproduction.
Structural functionalism entered sociology
through the work of American sociologist
Talcott Parsons (1902–79) and was later devel-
oped as ‘systems theory’ by Parsons and by
Niklas Luhmann (1927–99). Outside of the
anthropology–sociology nexus, functionalism
was also incorporated into some forms of
Marxism, provoking new theorizing about the
nature of functionalist explanation (Cohen,
1978; see alsoanalytical marxism), and in
the philosophy of the mind, where mental
states are conceived as a function of the cogni-
tive system of which they are part.
Oddly, given the influence of Darwinism
on geography and the magpie quality of geo-
graphical theorizing, functionalism was never
prominent in the discipline. It weaved in and
out of some early writings by European geo-
graphers, including Ratzel’s anthropogeo-
graphy and Vidal de la Blache’s vision
ofhuman geography. There were hints of
functionalism in Hartshorne’s (1939) notion of
theregionas an ‘element complex’, and even
stronger ones in the systems analysis intro-
duced to the discipline in the 1970s (although
it was mainly confined to environmental issues:
see Bennett and Chorley, 1978). The most
likely location for structural functionalism
within the modern discipline wassocial geog-
raphy, but by the time it became interested in
theoretical formalization, the star of structural
functionalism was fading in both anthropology
and sociology. Functionalism was more signifi-
cant in earlyradical geography. Thus Harvey
(1999 [1982]) conceived space and place as
functional elements in the reproduction of cap-
italism: capitalism reached back to ensure that
its landscape regenerated the system. Even
crises – the annihilation of space, the destruc-
tion of place – were functional. Similarly, the
regulation school advocated a posteriori
functionalism in its analysis of capitalism (the
success of the functional relation is known only
after the fact of its success).

All this said, the functionalism found in

human geography is often only implicit.

Further, given the drubbing that functionalism

has received over the past half-century – it is

variously accused of determinism, of neglect-

ing historical context, of denying individual

agency, of imbuing collective entities with

characteristics germane only to individuals

and of neglecting causal mechanisms – it is

unlikely ever to become explicit. tb

Suggested reading

Giddens (1977, ch. 2).

fuzzy sets/fuzzy logic Sets (categories, clas-

ses, types) for which the definitions of class

membership are vague or ‘fuzzy’, and contrast

with the sharp, clearly defined definitions

used by standard logic and set theory. Thus

‘deprived’ and ‘middle-class’ are fuzzy cat-

egories in everyday life and usage, only con-

verted into precise categories by government

or other statistical definitions. Fuzziness

describes a type ofuncertainty, but it is not

the usual uncertainty of probability (e.g. the

percentage chance of a US citizen being in the

‘deprived’ category). It describes ‘event ambi-

guity’, the degree to which an event occurs,

not whether it occurs. Most quantitative and

statistical modelling assumes non-fuzzy sets,

and only a few studies have developed fuzzy-

set applications relevant to geography, notably

Openshaw’s work on spatial interaction

using fuzzy distances (‘short’, ‘average’, ‘long’:

Openshaw and Openshaw, 1997). Openshaw

(1996) saw fuzzy logic as a key to make ‘soft

human geography’ more scientific, but most

would paint a much more modest picture of

its potential. lwh

Suggested reading

Openshaw and Openshaw (1997); Robinson

(2003).

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FUZZY SETS/FUZZY LOGIC