planning; (c) the nature of the intersec-
toral and interregional transmission of
growth; (d) the relationship between the
public provision ofinfrastructureand
the success of the growth pole; (e) the
relationship between the growth pole
and existing city distributions; and (f)
the need for monitoring and management
to avoid dis-economies.
(2) Political and policy horizons: the appropri-
ate time-span over which to judge suc-
cess or failure of a growth pole – say, 15–
25 years – is often too long in political
terms, as elected governments prefer re-
sults of their policies to be evident over
the length of the electoral cycle (which is
usually less than four years).
(3) Space–time path dependence: the success of
a growth pole depends upon the extent to
which it is linked to, and energizes and
dynamizes an existingspace-economyor
economiclandscape. Without such con-
formities, the spillover effects are severely
inhibited. Porter’s (1998a, 2000) advo-
cacy ofclustersas a means of enhancing
the competitive advantage of localities has
prompted critics such as Martin and
Sunley (2003) to object that such policy
interventions are merely one effective
geography of production that may lock
out other possibilities. rl
Suggested reading
Buttler (1975).
growth theory In the wake of the Second
World War, and after the experience of the
Marshall Plan in assisting the recovery of
war-torneurope, several economists with dir-
ect experience in multilateral institutions
and the Marshall Plan turned their attention
to the question of economicdevelopmentin
thethird world. Among these pioneers of
development thinking were Finnish economist
Ragnar Nurkse (1953), Austrian economist
Paul Rodenstein-Rodan (1976), German-
born and American-naturalized economist
Albert Hirschmann (1958), West Indian
Nobel Laureate Sir Arthur Lewis (1984), and
American economic historian Walt Rostow
(1960). Their ideas were far from identical,
but they formed a loose school of thought –
growth theorists – emphasizing a historically
informed and practical approach to economic
development, and stood at an angle to the
neo-classical models of Solow and others.
Rostow was something of an odd man out
insofar as his simple stage theory of
European industrial replication was both less
analytical and less historically sophisticated
than the others (cf.rostow model).
The growth theorists were framed by three
historical dynamics:the legacy of the Keynesian
revolutionand the experience of international
Keynesianism through the European recovery
programme; thepolitical agenda of the USAin
the wake of 1945 and increasingly during the
cold war, which turned on the use of Bretton
Woods institutions to foster development and
fair dealing, as President Truman put it in
1949; and thenationalist developmentalism(cf.
nationalism) associated with the last wave of
decolonization, which also emerged during
and after the Second World War. Growth the-
ory in its emphasis on aggregate phenomena
and on industrialization bred a predilection for
authoritative intervention – in which thestate
was a necessary actor – which involved plan-
ning systems, the application of economic
growth models andaidmechanisms.
All of the growth theorists shared some
sort of affinity for Keynes. They emphasized
aggregate economic processes such as rates
of saving and rates of investment (cf.neo-
classical economics). Poor economic per-
formance and lack of aggregate demand were
related. They also revealed a preference for
industrializationas a driving force – indeed,
they were advocates of what in the 1930s had
become import-substituting industrialization –
and for short-term state interventions.mar-
ketswere means not ends, and like Alexander
Gerschenkron (1968 – one of their contem-
poraries), they realized that late developers
required a dirigiste state. However, as growth
theorists they presumed that an economy
would achieve its best results within a com-
petitive market structure.
Each of the growth theorists is a major in-
tellectual figure in the history of economics,
but there were important commonalities and
points of confluence (if not necessarily agree-
ment), which animated their policy and theory
during the 1950s.
There was the concept ofhidden development
potential in the less developed nations. As
Gerschenkron had argued, there were ‘advan-
tages to backwardness’, and in these advantages
lay hiddencomparative advantages: A recognition ofmarket failuresand the role
of positiveexternalitiesin creating virtu-
ous circle effects. Rodenstein-Rodan’s
(1976) emphasis on social overhead capital
and the role of government was a case in
point.Gregory / The Dictionary of Human Geography 9781405132879_4_G Final Proof page 321 2.4.2009 6:30pmGROWTH THEORY