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geographies ‘permitted the birth of social sci-
ence in England’ (p. 276), the implication being
that subsequent academic geographies may also
have drawn on moralistic assumptions concern-
ingenvironmentandsociety. Jackson’s ac-
count of the work of the early-twentieth-
centurychicago schoolof urban sociologists
conversely shows how the identification of
forms of moral order underlying ‘apparent so-
cial disorganization’ (1984, p. 178) may allow a
critique of conventional moralistic assumptions
concerning life in the moderncity.Matless
(1994) develops the theme of moral geograph-
ies of conduct by considering how the geog-
raphy of a particular region, the Norfolk
Broads in eastern England, can be understood
in terms of competing formulations of appropri-
ate behaviour in the landscape. Moral geog-
raphies are here constituted through
assumptions concerningclassandlandscape.
Such work echoes studies ofsocial exclusion
andtransgressionin highlighting the basis on
which people may be labelled as in or out of
place feedback.
Some moral geographical work has sought a
prescriptive role. Sack (1997) argues for the
inherently geographical nature of moral ac-
tions in order to develop a framework through
which we might improve ourselves as moral
geographical subjects: ‘Thinking geographic-
ally heightens our moral concerns; it makes
clear that moral goals must be set and justified
by us in places and as inhabitants of a world’
(p. 24). Sack recognizes the complex vari-
ations of morality between different times
and places, but the aim, in common with the
tenor of muchhumanistic geography,isto
seek a normative framework for being human;
for being, in Sack’s terms, a ‘geographical
self’. For other work noted above, however,
the term ‘moral geographies’ is not prescrip-
tive, its use being informed by a philosophical
and political assumption that senses of moral
order are produced through environmental
and spatial practices that are always bound
up with relations ofpower. Here, the connec-
tion of the moral and the spatial in moral
geographies is bound up with a suspicion
regarding any claim to be able to define mor-
ality, and with a sceptical attitude to the social
power of the moral. dmat
Suggested reading
Driver (1988); Smith, D.M. (2000a).
moral landscapes The association of par-
ticularlandscapes with schemes of moral
value (see alsomoral geographies). Tuan
(1989) reviews the wide-ranging historical
and geographical association of particular
moral values with the landscapes of city, coun-
try and garden. A moral–spatialdialecticmay
also be identified whereby moral landscapes
both reflect and reproduce senses of moral
order. Work has focused on such processes in
the geography of institutions, in the use of
architecture and landscape design to promote
particular moral principles, and in the produc-
tion of consciously ‘alternative’ social spaces.
The institution as moral landscape is con-
sidered in Ploszajska’s (1994) work on the
Victorian reformatory school as an ‘environ-
ment of moral reform’. Such moral landscapes
are one element of a geographical interest in
relations ofspaceandpower, whereby spatial
organization is shown to be not only reflective
of but central to the workings of power.
Daniels’ (1982) study of the ‘morality of land-
scape’ in the work of Georgian landscape gar-
dener Humphry Repton shows how aesthetic
values of landscape design were at the same
time moral values concerning social harmony,
plebeian deference and aristocratic responsi-
bility. The theme of moral landscapes thereby
connects to aesthetic, social, political and
economic issues: indeed, all of those categor-
ies are shown to be mutually constitutive.
Pinder’s (2005c) study of utopianurbanism
in the twentieth century similarly draws out
the strong senses of moral order informing the
modernist urban schemes of architects and
planners such as Le Corbusier (seeutopia).
Studies of moral landscapes may also ad-
dress the ways in which moral value is located
in particular environments. Matless (1997)
considers how moral debates over conduct
in open-air landscape shaped cultures of
landscape,leisureand thebodyin twentieth-
century England, and served to reproduce
versions of English national identity.
Associations of morality andnature, whereby
moral order may be equated with a sense of
natural order, may also serve to enable particu-
lar groups or individuals to claim a moral land-
scape close to nature. Locating the moral in the
natural is a common trope of certain forms of
environmentalism, which cultivate an eco-
logical morality or environmental ethic around
an assumed moral community of the human
and nonhuman. Such work differs from much
of the work discussed above in operating with
a strongly normative sense of morality (see
alsomoral geographies). A normative use
of the term moral landscape is also found in
Ley’s (1993) work on co-operative housing
in Canada, presented as embodying moral
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MORAL LANDSCAPES