The Dictionary of Human Geography

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social differences such asraceorsexuality

are enacted through and disrupted by the

workings of a range of non-representational

modalities (e.g. Lim, 2007). However,

heavily influenced by Deleuze and

Guattari (McCormack, 2005) and work on

performativity(Dewsbury, 2000), the prefix

‘non-’ in ‘non-representational theory’ names

an attunement to moments of indeterminacy

and undecidability, in which new events

emerge to exceed and potentially disrupt

given orderings (although see Anderson

(2004) and Harrison (2007a) on boredom

and suffering for criticisms internal to non-

representational theory around how an atten-

tion to newness can downplay relations which

are, respectively, suspended and broken).

To work through the imperative and prom-

ise of non-representational theories, there has

been a nascent experimentation with research

methods, as well as diagrammatic and narra-

tive forms of presentation, that take as their

task to learn to witness the ongoing taking-

place of life as a composite of embodied prac-

tices.theoryis called here to act as a ‘modest

supplement’ to life that would enable new

forms of description – a move that has occa-

sionally sat uncomfortably with the intense

theoretical experimentation that has also

been a mark of non-representational theory.

Substantive work has begun, however, to

draw this set of theories into often disruptive

encounters with a range of sub-disciplines –

see, for example, Wylie (2005) onlandscape

or Horton and Kraftl (2006) onchildren’s

geographies. Taking the two commonalities

together, non-representational theory can

be understood as a style of engagement with

the world that, encountering a range of

non-representational theories that exceed

human geography, begins from the non-

representational dimensions of practice and

performance. ba

Suggested reading

Dewsbury, Harrison, Rose and Wylie (2002);

Lorimer (2005); Thrift (2008); Whatmore

(2002a).

normative theory A theory or theoretical

claim that is prescriptive, saying what ought

to be. The theory ofneo-classical econom-

icssays thatmarketsshould be competitive;

the theory ofmarxismsays that expropriators

should be expropriated. Whenever the word

‘should’ appears, a normative theoretical

claim is lodged. The contrast ispositive theory,

which is a claim about what is. Competitive

markets exist in China. Donald Trump is an

expropriator. Positive claims (such as these)

might be wrong but, if so, they can be scien-

tifically falsified by facts. Normative theory

is never falsifiable, and for that reason often

engenders sharp disagreement.

The use of the distinction is most associated

with economics. The early Cambridge econo-

mist John Neville Keynes (1852–1949) in his

The scope and method of political economy(1930

[1891], pp. 34–5) distinguished between posi-

tive economics, which is ‘a body of system-

atized knowledge concerning what is’, and

normative economics, ‘relating to criteria of

what ought to be and concerned therefore

with the ideal as distinguished from the ac-

tual’. Keynes made the distinction so that

economists could be scrupulously clear about

their role and status: when speaking of whatis

(positive economics), they were scientists, and

when speaking of whatought to be(normative

economics), they were policy advisors. The

two should never be confused.

Inhuman geographythe distinction be-

tween the positive and the normative was

found most often ineconomic geography

• not surprisingly, given its origins – and
  connected with the period of thequantita-
  tive revolution, when economic geograph-
  ers most demanded criteria delineating
  scientific work (positive theory). Ironically,
  however, much of the location theory
  seized upon and elaborated during that
  period was normative rather than positive,
  and so did not constitute science in Keynes’
  terms. Location theory was underpinned by a
  set of ‘ideal’ assumptions such as an isotropic
  plain, transportation costs proportional to
  distance, equal population density and per-
  fect rationality. August Lo ̈sch, one of the
  principal architects of location theory, was
  perfectly clear about its normative character:
  ‘the real duty of the economist is not to ex-
  plain our sorry reality, but to improve it. The
  question of the best location is far more dig-
  nified than determination of the actual one’
  (Lo ̈sch, 1954, p. 4[1940]). But this motiv-
  ation was rarely registered by economic geog-
  raphers at the time.
  In any case, the discussion became moot
  as the very distinction between positive and
  normative theory began to unravel from the
  early 1970s. Olsson (1980), a former acolyte
  of positive theory, argued that a mainstay of
  economic geography’s scientific approach, the
  family ofspatial interactionmodels, was
  irredeemably compromised by value judge-
  ments – ‘is’ disguised as ‘ought’. Similarly,

Gregory / The Dictionary of Human Geography 9781405132879_4_N Final Proof page 505 31.3.2009 3:13pm Compositor Name: ARaju

NORMATIVE THEORY