The Dictionary of Human Geography

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For example, while geographers during this

period were sceptical of theory, it was not

because they were persuaded by philosophical

arguments about the non-translation of an

observation vocabulary into a theoretical one,

but because theory implied a level of general-

ization that was deemed inappropriate to geo-

graphical subject matter (cf.exceptionalism).

The advent of thequantitative revolu-

tionin the late 1950s made positivism much

more relevant to geography. Empirical obser-

vations continued to be central, although they

were now often observations made by others

and recorded in thickcensusvolumes or on

drums of magnetic tape (thereby shifting

much geographical empirical enquiry from

the field to the desk). Verification became a

definitive pursuit undertaken using a set of

ever more sophisticated formal statistical tech-

niques (seequantitative methods). Constant

conjunctions were pursued, and Tobler

(1970) announced the First Law of

Geography: ‘Everything is related to every-

thing else, but near things are more related

than distant things.’ Positivism’s fourth fea-

ture, suspicion towards theoretical terms, did

not apply. Geography’s quantitative revolu-

tionaries were besotted by theory. In fact, the

revolution had been primarily a theoretical

one, especially ineconomic geographyand

urban geography, which were transformed

by importation of second-hand theory from

physics, economics and sociology. The pro-

spect of a unified method, however, was one

of the quantitative revolution’s strongest sell-

ing points.physical geographyandhuman

geographywould share a common language,

and geographical science would be at one

rather than a house divided. Finally, quantita-

tive revolutionaries prosecuted less the open

warfare on metaphysics that positivist philo-

sophers urged than a continual undertone of

carping about the need for greater precision,

less vagueness and the importance of the

exclusion of value judgements (seenormative

theory).

All of this said, there were few explicit dis-

cussions of positivism as such until it was on

the way out. Morrill (1993, p. 443), one of the

pioneers of the quantitative revolution, said he

‘never met a positivist’. And even Harvey’s

(1969) methodological compendium for sci-

entific geography,Explanation in geography,

barely used the word (it does not appear in

the index), preferring instead ‘scientific

method’. The quantitative revolution was

much more about getting on with the tasks of

theoretical development and application, or

crunching large data sets, than philosophizing

about what was being done in the name of

positivism. As a result, when some human

geographers later vigorously attacked positiv-

ism, it did not necessarily undermine the prac-

tices of quantitative revolutionaries and spatial

analysts, because the latter often neither knew

nor deployed the full array of positivist tenets

to begin with.

The critique of positivism was long and sus-

tained, and in many ways still continues. Each

one of the six features was criticized: (1) facts

do not speak for themselves, but are always

embedded in values, judgements and schemes

of interpretation (seeparadigms); (2) truth is

chimerical, and imbricated in larger social

relations ofpowerand knowledge (seecrit-

ical theory;discourse); (3) constant con-

junctions lead only to mindless statistical

exercises, and not to explanation (seereal-

ism); (4)theory should be central to our

enquiries, albeit not conceived as a mirror of

the world, but as reflexive, critical, productive

and provisional; (5) physical sciences offer no

privileged method, but are fallible, contradict-

ory, and limited by their historical and

geographical situation (see science); and

(6) metaphysics goes all the way down, the

lifeblood of our social existence and produc-

tion of knowledge (seeethics;relevance;

values).

These counter-claims amount to a reasser-

tion of the social foundations and responsibil-

ities of intellectual enquiry, and a refusal to

separate science from other discourses. Few

geographerswouldnowcount themselves as

positivist. Post-positivist geographies have:

dimmed the enthusiasm for unbridled use of

quantitative techniques; given a new slant to

areas that formerly were characterized as posi-

tivist, such as economic geography and, more

recently, geographical information sys-

tems; and opened up new fields such asfemi-

nismandpost-colonialism. In general, the

fall of positivism in geography undermined the

certainty and even optimism that the

Quantitative Revolution and spatial science

had promised, replacing it with what Gregory

(1994) calls a ‘cartographic anxiety’ (see

cartographic reason). Geography had

grown up. tb

Suggested reading

Gregory (1978); Kolakowski (1972).

possibilism A claim that human societies

may respond in a variety of ways to the influ-

ences of the physical environment. Possibilism

Gregory / The Dictionary of Human Geography 9781405132879_4_P Final Proof page 559 1.4.2009 3:20pm

POSSIBILISM