28 March/April 2022
GETTY^ IMAGESMilitary
(^6) Tech
// BY THOM AS MUTCH //
F
OURTEEN YEARS AFTER DUBBING ITS
most powerful non-nuclear weapon ever
developed “the Mother of All Bombs”
(MOAB), the U.S. military finally found
an opportunity to test the ordnance on
the battlefield. In April 2017, intelligence
officials had located a large cell of Islamic
State Khorasan, the terrorist group also known
as ISIS-K, hiding in a cave complex in Nangarhar
province on the border with Pakistan.
The GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast, to
use its official name, had shown promise during
demonstrations in testing grounds, such as Eglin
Air Force Base in Florida, since its unveiling in- But the Pentagon had never deployed it in
actual battle, over concerns about civilian casual-
ties. This cell, however, was believed to be remote
enough for a MOAB deployment.
According to the initial assessment by the
Afghan Ministry of Defense and local media
reports, the surprise blast swept through the
caves with ease, causing at least 36 casualties,
without harming any known civilians. (The
U.S. government never publicly released its own
damage assessment.) For the Pentagon, this was
more than a strike against terrorists: It served to
demonstrate the feasibility of its newly developed
weapons systems.
In many ways, Afghanistan was the ideal bat-
tleground for trialing new technology. Unlike in
Iraq and Syria, much of the fighting took place in
rural or mountainous areas with low concentra-
tions of civilians. Using the GBU-43/B near urban
centers would constitute a war crime under inter-
national law because the force would have been
“indiscriminate,” causing civilian deaths and the
destruction of critical infrastructure.
Using an active conflict to experiment and
demonstrate the effects of new technology is noth-
ing new. World War II saw the rapid development
and deployment of technology ranging from com-
puters for codebreaking to nuclear weapons. More
recently, during the First Gulf War, the U.S. and
its allies tested satellite surveillance and target
identification technology that enabled coalition
forces to disable the once-fearsome Iraqi army.
In Afghanistan, the U.S. military first demon-
strated a major new capability before its invasion.
A prototype Predator drone had been loitering
over Kandahar in September 2000 when its opera-
Did the U.S.
Lose a Crucial
Testing Ground
When It Left
Afghanistan?
Members of the
82nd Airborne
Division test C4
in Afghanistan
in 2002.