The Washington Post - USA (2022-02-20)

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SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 20 , 2022. THE WASHINGTON POST EZ EE G3


crashed on its territory in 2016.
That one contained foreign-made
components and Russian soft-
ware, according to CAR and Lith-
uanian security services.
The case shows that Russia
uses drones “for intelligence col-
lection not only in conflict zones
but also in peacetime in neigh-
bouring NATO countries,” Lithu-
anian authorities said in a 2019
document.

Natalia Abbakumova in Moscow
contributed to this report.

Moscow’s regional government.
The directorate was established
to “implement state policy in the
field of public and economic se-
curity,” according to the website
of Moscow’s regional govern-
ment.
According to CAR, similar
drone models have been recov-
ered after flying over Syria and
Libya, countries where Russian
troops or mercenaries have also
engaged in military action. Lithu-
ania, a member of NATO, discov-
ered an identical model that

not be reached for comment. The
company was founded in the spa
town of Karlovy Vary in 2008 by
two residents of Moscow, accord-
ing to Czech business registration
documents identified by CAR and
reviewed by The Post.
From 2012 to 2014, a third
Moscow-area resident served as a
director of the company, accord-
ing to those documents. CAR
researchers found that this per-
son was also a member of an
advisory council to the Main Di-
rectorate of Public Security for

Russian entity called ANO PO
KSI, which it said purchased such
items for educational institutions
in Russia, according to the CAR
report.
ANO PO KSI, which is a Rus-
sian a cronym for Professional As-
sociation of Designers of Data
Processing Systems, was added to
a sanctions list by the United
States in 2016 for allegedly aiding
Russian military intelligence.
On its website, ANO PO KSI
describes itself as a nonprofit that
makes high-tech products, in-
cluding document scanners and
cameras, for the Russian govern-
ment and business customers.
The organization didn’t respond
to a request for comment.
In an email to The Post, Silicon
Sensing said it “vigorously” com-
plies “with all export control laws
and policies everywhere we do
business.” It added, “These com-
ponents were sold in 2012 to a
commercial company that was
not on an embargo list at that
time. We have ceased doing busi-
ness with that company and any
related entities.”
The drone also contained
U.S.-made components designed
for navigation and wireless com-
munication. One of the suppliers,
Digi International, based in Min-
nesota, told CAR that it sold the
wireless communications compo-
nent to a U.S.-based distributor in
March 2012, but that the distribu-
tor was unable to identify the
ultimate recipient, according to
the CAR report.
Digi International told The
Post that it screens all sales to be
sure it isn’t supplying any prohib-
ited parties in violation of U.S.
export control laws. “We do not
know how the product in ques-
tion ended up in a Russian drone.
We do not condone the use of our
modules by foreign actors in mili-
tary use cases,” the company said
in an emailed statement.
Maxim Integrated, based in
California, told CAR that it manu-
factured a navigation component
found in the drone in 2013 and
shipped it to its distributors in
January 2014. It added that the
component “is not designed for
use in unmanned aerial vehicles.”
Maxim parent company Ana-
log Devices declined to clarify for
The Post what the component is
used for. In an emailed statement,
the company said it “is commit-
ted to full compliance with U.S.
laws including U.S. export con-
trols, trade sanctions and regula-
tions.”
Other companies in Switzer-
land and the United Kingdom
told CAR they were unable to
track the chain of suppliers that
had handled their components.
The drone’s engine, a single-cyl-
inder unit with an electronic
ignition, traveled a particularly
mysterious route, from a small
company near Frankfurt, Ger-
many, that makes parts for model
airplanes.
The company, 3W Modellmo-
toren Weinhold, which did not
respond to a request for com-
ment, told CAR that it had sent
the engine to World Logistic
Group, a company based in the
Czech Republic, in October 2013.
The Czech company, which
ceased operations in 2018, could

Russian networks have found
ways around those obstacles. In
2015, several Russian agents were
convicted of, or pleaded guilty to,
federal charges of using a Texas-
based company they set up to
illegally export high-tech chips to
Russian military and intelligence
agencies.
Under the broader blockade
that U.S. officials are considering,
the United States could compel
many countries worldwide to cut
their chip exports to Russia by
telling them they aren’t allowed
to use U.S. technology to make
components for Russian buyers.
Most chip factories worldwide,
including those in China and
Taiwan, use U.S. manufacturing
tools or software in their produc-
tion process, analysts said.
The United States could limit
the ban to Russia’s military and
high-tech sectors or could apply it
more broadly, potentially depriv-
ing Russian citizens of some
smartphones, tablets and video
game consoles, The Washington
Post recently reported, citing ad-
ministration officials.
CAR determined that the
drones it investigated were used
for reconnaissance missions in
eastern Ukraine, where Russia
has been fueling a separatist war
since 2014.
At the invitation of Ukraine’s
security services, Spleeters from
CAR flew to Kyiv in late 2018 to
dissect the drone that was shot
down in 2017. Using a duffel bag
stuffed with screwdrivers, Allen
wrenches and cameras, Spleeters
disassembled and photographed
the aircraft, looking for serial
numbers and markings that
could help identify where the
parts came from.
He and his colleagues then
contacted the component suppli-
ers to try to trace how the parts
wound up in the drone. One
motion-sensing chip was manu-
factured by the British company
Silicon Sensing Systems, which
makes components for drones,
car navigation systems and in-
dustrial machinery. The company
told CAR that it sold the chip in
August 2012 to a Russian civilian
electronics distributor, sending it
through UPS in a package with
50-odd components, according to
the CAR report.
The Russian distributor told
Silicon Sensing that the chip was
to be used in a drone; it later
added that it sold the chip to a

to Ukraine to dissect several
drones. All were loaded with
Western electronics.
Without those parts, said
Spleeters, who summarized his
findings in a report funded by the
European Union and Germany,
Russia would have found it
“much more difficult to produce
and operate the drones for sure.”
As tensions mount over a pos-
sible Russian invasion of
Ukraine, U.S. officials are consid-
ering trade sanctions designed to
deprive Russia of foreign-made
computer chips and electronics.
Spleeters’s investigation shows
how profoundly the ban could
hurt Russia’s military and why it
might be hard to pull off.
Russia is known for its scien-
tists and hackers but makes little
of its own electronics or comput-
er hardware, relying largely on
imports. Yet blocking the flow of
these goods could prove difficult.
Some of the drone components
that CAR identified traveled to
Russia via obscure middlemen
and small trading companies
whose businesses could be tough
to track.
What’s more, the relatively
small quantities that Russia’s mil-
itary is likely to need might allow
it to acquire components surrep-
titiously, said Malcolm Penn, the
chief executive of London-based
semiconductor research firm Fu-
ture Horizons.
“If you only want 500 or 1,000,
it’s easily doable and very hard to
stop,” he said. “All throughout the
Cold War, when in theory there
were no exports to the Soviet
Union, that didn’t stop them from
getting things. There are always
men with suitcases that go out to
the Far East and buy stuff and
come back.”
Another big wild card is China,
which could thwart any U.S. at-
tempt to choke off chips to Rus-
sia. CAR estimated that the
drones it examined were built
between 2013 and 2016, when
Western suppliers were more
dominant in the chip industry.
China has since become a much
bigger manufacturer of electron-
ic components, and is unlikely to
fully comply with any attempted
blockade, technology experts
said.
Russia relies on Asian and
Western countries to supply most
of its consumer electronics and
computer chips, which are the
brains that make electronics
function. Russian imports of
these goods in 2020 exceeded
$38 billion, according to United
Nations trade data.
The Soviet Union had a variety
of small semiconductor factories
churning out chips, mostly for
military use, according to Penn,
who visited some of the facilities
in the early 1990s. But the Soviet
breakup pushed Russia into a
long period of turmoil that
thwarted development of tech-
nology industries and manufac-
turing.
“The microelectronics indus-
try was completely decimated in
the 1990s,” said Sam Bendett, a
Russian-military analyst at the
Virginia-based research group
CNA. “It was just easier to import
these technologies, which were
widely available in the global
market.”
The Russian and Ukrainian
embassies in Washington did not
respond to requests for comment.
Russia retains some manufactur-
ers that produce chips of older
designs, including Mikron, which
was founded in Soviet times near
Moscow. Enterprises in the coun-
try also design chips known by
the names Baikal and Elbrus —
the latter used by the military —
but send many of the designs to
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufac-
turing Co., the world’s largest
chip foundry, for fabrication.
Russian defense contractors in
recent years have claimed to have
revived some domestic manufac-
turing of high-tech military
equipment, including drones and
their components, Bendett said.
The United States and the Eu-
ropean Union restrict their ex-
ports of defense-related electron-
ics to Russia and have toughened
those rules in recent years. Yet


RUSSIA FROM G1


How Russia obtained Western parts in drones over Ukraine


VITALY TIMKIV/RUSSIAN NEWS AGENCY TASS/GETTY IMAGES
Russian forces launch an unmanned aircraft for military exercises in 2017. Russian drones shot down over Ukraine that year had parts made in the United States and Europe.

CONFLICT ARMAMENT RESEARCH

This wireless communications part made in the United States was
found in a Russian military drone shot down over Ukraine in 2017.


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