The Economist - UK (2022-02-19)

The Economist February 19th 2022 Middle East & Africa 47

W

hathamistoParma,cheeseisto

Caerphillyandsparklingwineisto

a certainregionofFrance,thespiky­

hairedsugarloafpineappleistoBenin.

Lastyearthisjuicydelicacywasgranted

thewestAfricancountry’sfirst“geo­

graphicalindication”(gi), a legallabel

thatmarksoutproductsthatcomefrom

a particularregion.

Benin’smovesignalsa widertrend.

Otherplaceshavelongsoughtspecial

statusfortheirfanciestfodder.France

andItalyhaveroughly6,000gis each.

Africanswanta sliceoftheaction.It

couldbetasty.Salesofproductsgivengi

statusbytheeuareworth€75bna year

($83bn).Onaveragefoodswithgistatus

commanda 43%pricepremium,saysa

recentstudy.Forwine,whichmakesup

morethan50%ofsalesofeu­protected

products,thatrisesto300%.

Beninhopesthatgis willnotonly

sweetenitspineappleexports—the

fourthbiggestinwestAfrica—butalso

makeitssalesofcashews,sheanutsand

sheabuttermorefruitful.Higherprices

couldmakea bigdifferenceina country

where38%ofpeopleworkonfarmsand

45%liveonlessthan$1.90a day.

Othersintheregionhopetobenefit,

too.Cameroon’sPenjapepperwasthe

firstAfricanproducttoreceivethecov­

etedlabelin2013.Salesofthesought­

afterpeppercorn,whichisgrowninthe

volcanicsoilsofMountCameroon,

helpedstimulatea six­foldriseinlocal

farmers’incomes.Itnowgracesthe

platesofMichelin­starredchefs.

gis havethepotentialtoencourage

farmerstobandtogethertoimprove

standardsandearnhigherprices.Buta

bigchallenge,saysMichaelBlakeney,a

professorattheUniversityofWestern

Australia,willbetomakesurethatthe

benefitsofpremiumpricesarepassedon

tofarmersandarenotcapturedby

middlemen,whotypicallyhavemore

informationaboutmarketsthansmall­

scalefarmers.

Moreover,competitionisintensify­

ingasmorecountriesseekprotectedgis

fortheirownproducts.Penjapepper

alreadyhasrivalsfromCambodiaand

Indonesia.Benin’spineappleswillhave

tobattleagainstthelikesofHuayMon

ones,whichThailandhopestoprotect.

Thoughsurelya sugarloafbyanyother

namewouldnottasteassweet.

Foodlabels

Thechampagne of Benin

Howthesugarloafpineapplejoinedthepantheonofposhnosh

By theirfruits,youwillknowthem

JihadistsintheSahel

French leave

W

hentheyarrivedin 2013 itwasina
rush:  250  men  from  a  base  in  Sene­
gal;  950  from  Chad;  helicopters  and  men
from  Burkina  Faso.  With  fast­moving  col­
umns  of  jihadists  dashing  south  through
Mali  and  poised  to  capture  Bamako,  the
capital, within days, there was no time for
a multinational force from the un or eco-
was, the regional bloc. François Hollande,
then French president, ordered his troops
into Mali, urging them to “get it done”. 
And  they  did.  Within  hours  they  were
attacking  the  jihadists;  within  weeks
France was recapturing cities such as Tim­
buktu and Gao. Yet what had been planned
as a brief intervention turned into a grind­
ing nine­year struggle against jihadists af­
filiated to al­Qaeda and Islamic State. Now
they are leaving, their mission incomplete.
On  February  17th,  after  meeting  in  Paris
with  European  and  African  partners,
France  announced  that  “due  to  multiple
obstructions”  by  the  current  Malian  re­
gime  it  would  withdraw  its  roughly  2,400
troops from Mali. A European special­forc­
es mission is withdrawing, too.
The  immediate  cause  is  a  diplomatic
breakdown between France (and its allies)
and the junta that overthrew Mali’s elected
government in 2020, led a second coup last
year  and  has  since  refused  to  hand  power
to  civilians.  The  junta  recently  kicked  out
the  French  ambassador  and  Danish  com­
mandos, who were helping it fight the jiha­
dists.  Rubbing  salt  in  the  wound,  it  hired
Russian mercenaries from Wagner Group.
Yet  the  roots  of  this  withdrawal  are
deeper.  France’s  campaign,  which  started
so well, has been going badly. In 2020 more
than 6,000 people were killed in conflict in
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, about seven
times more than in 2016. About 3.5m have
been forced from their homes. 
France  and  the  region’s  armies  have
won tactical victories—since January 2020
they have killed about 2,700 militants—yet
the jihadists continue to recruit and grow.
Militants have since swept out of Mali and
spread terror through Burkina Faso and Ni­
ger and are now striking south into coastal
states  such  as  Benin  and  Ivory  Coast.  Ef­
forts to slow recruitment through econom­
ic development and improved governance
have  lagged.  Insecurity  has  triggered  a
spate of coups with popular backing.
France’s  withdrawal  from  Mali  casts  a
shadow  over  multinational  efforts  to  sta­
bilise  it.  The  un’s  mission,  Minusma,  has

some 12,000 blue­helmeted troops includ­

ing contingents from Britain and Germany.

French  help  will  be  less  readily  available

when they come under attack. Some troop

contributors may follow the French out. 

France will continue to fight jihadists in

the region, but its task will be all the more

difficult as the militants carve out more ha­

vens  in  Mali.  The  burning  question  is

whether  Mali’s  neighbours  can  hold  their

own.  President  Emmanuel  Macron  said

that  European  forces  would  be  re­centred

on  Niger.  Countries  in  the  Gulf  of  Guinea

would get extra help too. They will need it.

The  coastal  states  are  richer  and  have

stronger armies, which means they have a

better  chance  of  holding  back  the  jihadist

tide. But the fact thattheyface this test is in

itself a worrying defeat,for the region and

for its Western allies.n

J ACQUEVILLE AND PARIS
France and its allies are leaving Mali,
but their fight is not done