Handbook of Psychology, Volume 4: Experimental Psychology

Introduction 401

brain is composed of numerous specific mechanisms, often
calledmodules,that are designed by evolution to solve spe-
cific problems. This theory of modularity is more or less
universally accepted at the sensory level (e.g., eyes to solve
the problem of sight) and at the level of organs (e.g., the heart
to solve the problem of pumping blood), but is controversial
at the level of higher order central processes (e.g., a module
in the brain for the preference for one’s own kin) (see, e.g.,
Fodor, 1983).
One informative view of how various environmental fac-
tors interact with mental modules or specific problem-solving
devices was proposed by Pinker (1994) (see Figure 14.1).
The mental modules, which are built by heredity to solve
some specific problem (e.g., speaking with others), are mod-
ified by the environment (e.g., hearing English rather than
French) and by skills, knowledge, and values (e.g., knowing
to speak when important information is to be conveyed). The
approach shown in Figure 14.1 contrasts with a view of mind
that is widespread in psychology in general and with a view
of evolution held by many psychologists. Many psycholo-
gists tend to favor the idea that the mind is best conceptual-
ized as a general problem-solving device, a device that can be
applied to many different problems. As for evolution, many
psychologists believe, implicitly if not explicitly, in what is
known as continuity—for example, some process such as in-
telligence increases gradually and progressively from (say)
birds to humans.
A compromise between the general computer versus
specific models view is sometimes suggested. For example,
Mithen (1996)—an archeologist—believes, on the basis of
the fossil evidence and evidence from comparing various
species of animals, that in humans the mental modules, rather
than being completely independent or encapsulated, are ca-
pable of interacting with each other. In any event, evolution-
ary psychology rejects what has come to be known as the
standard social science model, or SSSM. The SSSM, in brief,
suggests that while animals may be controlled by biology,
humans are responsive to culture. Dominated by learning,

humans are molded by culture through a system of rewards

and punishments, according to the SSSM. Whether some an-

imals can be said to possess culture will be considered in the

final section of this chapter.

The belief of evolutionary biologists and psychologists is

that the mind consists (to use an analogy) of numerous spe-

cialized computers, each designed to solve some particular

problem. This approach rules out, as is perhaps apparent,

continuity in favor of the idea that animals that face particu-

lar problems evolve specialized learning and cognitive mech-

anisms to deal with those problems. To put the matter bluntly,

a rat, a monkey, and a chimpanzee do not represent, only or

necessarily, animals of increasing intelligence approaching

that of a human being. There may indeed be some gain in

learning ability over these species, but each at the same time

has evolved specialized mechanisms to deal with the particu-

lar problems it faces in its own environment. For example,

bees, which in some respects lack the learning abilities of

rats, seem nevertheless to be better able to communicate the

location of a food source to their conspecific than are rats.

Bees, of course, communicate the distance and direction of a

food source to their conspecifics by doing what is called

adancein the hive. To use another example closer to home,

language, rather than having evolved slowly over many

different species, may be a specialized ability in humans

lacking in any significant respect in any other species. Most

notably the much-investigated chimpanzee. If this is the case,

then the considerable effort expended to teach dolphins,

gorillas, and especially chimpanzees language may be less

worthwhile, theoretically speaking, than the trainers of these

animals might hope.

As the previous example may imply, evolutionary biolo-

gists and psychologists believe that at least some problems

investigated by social scientists, who have an outdated con-

ception of evolution, are a waste of time and effort. As

Symons (1987, 1992) has noted, social scientists sometimes

postulate explanatory mechanisms that could not possibly

have survived if current evolutionary thinking is correct. As a

innate psychological mechanisms,

heredity including learning mechanisms

behavior

skills, knowledge,

values

develops

and

accesses

provides

input to

causes

builds

environment

Figure 14.1 From Pinker’s (1994) book The Language Instinct,which shows how heredity, environ-

ment, skills, knowledge, and values interact to influence the innate psychological mechanisms that

cause behavior.