authorized, in Resolution No. 678, the multinational force, which had by then
been largely assembled (as allowed in Article 51 of the UN Charter), to use ‘all
necessary means’ to liberate Kuwait and to restore peace to the region.
Meanwhile, within days of the original military reaction, the USA dispatched
a light force to defend Saudi Arabia, which was feared to be under threat of
invasion by Iraqi troops stationed on the Kuwaiti border, at the request of the
Saudi government. Pressure from Western members of the UN Security
Council led to the swift imposition of economic sanctions involving an
international embargo on all trade with Iraq (thus forcing the suspension of
Iraq’s economic lifeline, its oil exports), except for medical and humanitarian
relief supplies.
There were several politically sensitive issues with which the UN-sponsored
allied powers had to contend. The USA, which was always the clear leader of
the campaign to liberate Kuwait, was anxious to broaden the basis of the
coalition so that Iraq could not present itself as a Third World power being
bullied by the capitalist West. This was extremely successful, because several
Arab nations, most importantly Egypt and Syria (which did not even have
diplomatic relations with the USA at the time), joined up, as did some, but not
all, NATO members. During the autumn and early winter the allied nations
built up their forces in Saudi Arabia, especially the USA which committed
430,000 ground troops, 1,300 fighter and support aircraft, 2,000 tanks and 55
warships. (The British contribution, though much smaller in absolute num-
bers, represented 50% of the armoured and air assets of the British Army of the
Rhine.) Although the then Soviet Union was not prepared to dispatch forces,
it was generally supportive of the Western members in the Security Council,
and certainly made it clear that thisMiddle Eastcrisis was not going to
become acold warissue. It took some time for the USA and other allies to
persuade the Security Council to move from sanctions to an outright ultima-
tum, and to authorize the use of force. At the end of November they finally
agreed unanimously to authorize the use of military force if Iraq failed to
withdraw completely from Kuwait, and to agree to the payment of compensa-
tion to Kuwait, by 15 January 1991.
There was also a domestic political battle for the US president, George
Bush, in persuading an increasinglyisolationistUSA to allow him to fight.
Although those opposed invoked the fears of anotherVietnam War, and there
was much criticism in the Senate, ultimately he gained the necessary authority.
As the ultimatum drew near there was considerable scepticism as to whether
the US-led coalition forces would, or even could, take effective military action.
Much was made of the apparent size and technical competence of the Iraqi
forces, particularly the Revolutionary Guard. Iraq had, after all, fought the
Iran–Iraq Warto a standstill over eight years of battles as bloody as anything
since the First World War. It was doubted by many, most importantly by the
Gulf War