seem to lead to higher rankings than the danger, unpleasantness and social
utility of an occupation. Once established, the status stratification can affect
decisions made by, for example bank managers or traffic police, in favour of
those with higher status where the realities of a situation, such as income or
driving offence, are equal. Status rankings are never uniform throughout a
society, and there usually exist subcultures with markedly different evaluations
of status from the dominant culture of the society. For example, the most
successful or violent criminal might head their own status ranking. But some
form of social stratification, interweaving income, class, traditional values from
the past, religious affiliation and many other factors seems to exist everywhere,
even in relatively egalitarian societies. Even republics, which have overtly
overthrown aristocratic classes, often feel the need to invent their own honours
systems with complex orders of decorations and medals.
Stockholm Declaration
The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 (seeHelsinki process) had included, as a
suggestion for confidence-building measures, the idea of extensive exchanges
of information on military exercises and movements by the participating
members. The Madrid follow-up conference of 1980–83 recommended the
creation of a parallel negotiating forum, the Conference on Security and
Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, usually abbre-
viated to CDE. This conference began to meet in Stockholm in 1984, and by
1986 had produced a far-reaching agreement, the Stockholm Declaration, on
confidence-building measures. The agreement introduced quite severe restric-
tions on the numbers of troops which could be deployed in an exercise, on the
numbers of troops which could be moved out of barracks at any one time and,
most importantly, on advance notice periods that had to be given for any such
movements or exercises. Above all rights of inspection were provided for,
including unannounced ‘challenge inspections’ and flights by observers over
the area of an exercise to monitor the movement of troops. These agreements
were immediately and scrupulously observed by all signatory states (the USA,
Canada and all European states, with the exception of Albania). The impetus
for these confidence-building measures was based on an old theory, much
influenced by reflections on the origin of the first world war, that wars are
often the result of an automatic process of mobilization triggered by nervous-
ness on the part of one country in the face of apparently sudden and
threatening troop movements by another. At the time very significant, it is
unclear whether this agreement will hold and help control the risk of pre-
emptive war in the new European order. (See also Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe.)
Stockholm Declaration