Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates

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116 Islam and Modernity


prosecution for qalin cases evidently took place mainly when the parties failed to
honour their promises, so that, ironically, Soviet courts were used to enforce the
proper practice of qalin. See Northrop (2001a).


  1. It is quite signifi cant that in a survey carried out in Tashkent in 2001 less than 2%
    of respondents mentioned that the institution of polygamy is justifi ed by the laws
    of Islam. Most identifi ed polygamy as the prerogative of new wealth, although the
    majority disapproved of its effects on the health of the family unit. See Pogrebov
    (2006).

  2. Most ethnographic accounts of gender relations are based on pre-war research or
    refugee contexts. Some of the main sources are Nancy Tapper (1991), Grima
    (1992) and Shalinsky (1994). There is, currently, a signifi cant dearth of scholarly
    work on changing social relations except in relation to strategic topics such as
    the production and trade of narcotics and the dynamics of armed insurgency.

  3. Barakat and Wardell (2002), for instance, refer to these dualities to develop their
    argument, while Dupree (1998a) draws our attention to the role of an insulated
    Westernised elite that was effectively cut off from the rural majority. Moghadam
    (1993: 248), whilst acknowledging the characteristics of Afghanistan as a ‘weak’
    state ruling over a patriarchal, tribal society, also invokes ‘the very real confl icts
    between modernisers and traditionalists and between women’s emancipation and
    patriarchy’.

  4. Afghanistan became a party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
    Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), signed without reservations in March
    2003 under circumstances that are still unclear. Signatory governments are
    normally bound to produce progress reports. As of 2008, no such report had
    been forthcoming.

  5. This was the case in the 1924 and 1929 rebellions and again, but without the
    same success, in 1959, when Daoud introduced legislation lifting the compulsory
    wearing of the veil and turned on the ulama for opposing him.

  6. The fact that foreign aid to the resistance was distributed through the Pakistani
    government, which singled out seven Sunni Islamist parties as ‘offi cial’ recipients
    of assistance, had a decisive impact on the shape of the political fi eld. It is worth
    noting that these parties had little infl uence inside Afghanistan before the Soviet
    invasion. See Hyman ([1984] 1992).

  7. The parliament – where women benefi t from a quota of 25% reserved seats – has
    been the scene of tense face-offs between women MPs and male members of
    mujahidin parties.

  8. Domestically generated revenue as a percentage of GNP was a mere 6%, even in
    the period of stability that preceded the fall of the monarchy (Rubin 1995: 63–4).
    In 1972, the two greatest resources that formed the backbone of the economy –
    agriculture and livestock – yielded a mere 1% of state revenue. See Hyman
    ([1984]1992: 32).

  9. These reached their apex under the PDPA, when women were hired in
    unprecedented numbers, especially during the war years. In the state apparatus as
    a whole by the summer of 1988 women accounted for 18.6% of the staff, with the
    highest proportion in the Ministry of Education, where they formed 43% of
    personnel. Overall in 1986, 270,000 women held jobs compared to only 5,000 in
    1978, and there were 5,000 women among the police and militia. See Giustozzi
    (2000).

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