274 Islam and Modernity
by the trappings of sophisticated instruments, though, as he was quick to point
out, he was not opposed to technological innovation itself. In his view, modern
technological innovations were not any different from the scientifi c achieve-
ments of medieval times. Similar instruments, and here he mentioned the instru-
ments of astronomy, could have been introduced to Muslim societies before
modernisation (Shafi 1963). They were available then as they are available now.
For the practice of Islam, they were then rejected and thus paved the way for
how modern Muslims should address the new inventions. In this response, there
is a strong argument against the special nature of modernity and its technology.
Mufti Shafi ’s cautious rejection of technological tools illustrates his rooted-
ness in the traditions of the past. But it also shows his domestication of this new
modernity in the world of traditional Islam, a critique in its own right.
A further point of interest in his discourse is his understanding of the past
and the present, and their implications for identity. In another fatwa, the Mufti
is asked if Muslims were duty bound to follow one particular madhhab (school of
jurisprudence) to the exclusion of others. Given that they were all acceptable,
should not Muslims be permitted to follow any school, and should they not be
permitted to follow one in one issue, and another in some other issues. Mufti
Shafi , in agreement with the Deobandi position, believed that Muslims should
not be free to decide for themselves. The fi rst step in his response is to assert that
taqlid was a requirement for those who were not experts in the sciences of Islam.
To this end, he cites the Quran and hadith proof-texts in support. Having done
this, he is confi dent in having narrowed down the question to the problem of
taqlid within a specifi c school. He concedes that a general commitment to recog-
nised juristic authorities was already evident in the early years of Islam. Muslims
then did not confi ne themselves to a particular teacher or school. However,
after the fi rst 300 years, when conditions had worsened, the ulama forbade
ordinary lay Muslims (amma) from following the advice of multiple authorities.
The reason for this, he says, was that individuals had begun consulting the jurists
for opinions in order to satisfy their own individual whims (hawa). When this
happened, the scholars prohibited lay persons from following multiple juridical
authorities. He does not provide substantial support for these historical state-
ments, but bases his argument on a combination of divine historical destiny
and probabilities. It is a fact, a divine blessing according to Mufti Shafi , that
Sunni Muslims have held on to the four juridical schools. And it is also a fact
that no other schools have emerged. Apart from these historical sweeps, it is
interesting to note how the fear of personal whim and caprice (hawa) occupies
his argumentation. The ordinary lay Muslim must hold fi rmly to the doctrines
of his or her juristic school. The earlier venerable scholars of the past had cau-
tioned Muslims to avoid the slippery slopes of personal whim and caprice. With
his focus on this personal confrontation and fear, Mufti Shafi removes all other
conditions from history such as power, rationalism and the encounters with