74 Islam and Modernity
and religious networks of patronage and allegiance, as well as the familiar
religious slogans, and symbols of faith, and the cult of the martyrs.^17
The repressive and authoritarian regime established by the mullahs under
the banner of Islamic government was equally modern: a clique captures the
commanding heights of a petrol state and uses its resources for consolidating
power and wealth. The Islamic institutions and ideologies of this regime then
lose their garb of piety and are seen by the ruled population for what they are:
politicians clinging to power and wealth. Yet, the popular revolution was not just
a change of government. The mobilisation of wide sectors of the Iranian popu-
lation, including prominently women, shook the foundations of authority. New
attitudes and expectations made it diffi cult for the mullahs to eradicate opposi-
tion, despite repression, at times severe. This loosening of control was aided by
the rise of rival centres of power within the government, religious and economic
institutions, and personnel. No single dictator, no Saddam or Mubarak, was
to arise and monopolise power. Reversing the general trend towards piety in
the region, Iranians, whenever given the opportunity, displayed their rejection
of religious rule. From the 1997 election of Khatami to the presidency, then
the parliamentary elections of 1999, Iranians supported reform, and were bit-
terly critical of the failed reformers. Ultimately the conservative mullahs had to
resort to further transparent acts of repression and falsifi cation in order to retain
control. The election of the populist hard-liner Ahmadinejad to the presidency
in 2005 was the result of such manipulation, added to the disillusionment of
the masses with the failed reforms and the continuing economic hardships and
disparities. The struggles continue.
A short note on the modern history of Iraqi politics
Iraqi cities, like their Iranian counterparts, maintained strong elements of quarter
identity and solidarity. In the fi rst half of the twentieth century, migration to
Baghdad was confi ned to specifi c areas adjacent to the city. Urban identities in
Baghdad were reinforced by the religious and ethnic divisions of the city. The
suburb of al-Kadhimayn, for instance, housed the holy shrine and pilgrimage
centre of the Shii Imam al-Kadhim. Across the river was al-Azamiyya, named
after the shrine of Abu Hanifa (known as al-Imam al-Azam) located there, and
as such a Sunni centre. Other districts were predominantly Jewish or Kurdish.
In the political and ideological struggles of the twentieth century, these quarters
functioned, not according to their sectarian identities, but mostly as centres
of the various modern political forces. The Iraqi Communist Party organised
wide popular constituencies among the intelligentsia and the workers, and in
the middle decades of the century also had a wide following among the urban
poor. Their rivals and antagonists in opposition politics were various strands of
Arab nationalists. In the 1940s and 1950s, the Shii and Kurdish quarters were