Political Modernity 77electoral politics is not peculiar to the region: the very term comes from the
USA, where much party support comes from interested constituencies (Kienle
2000: 51–67).
The Nasserist state was strongly ideological, pushing the symbols of pan-
Arab nationalism and socialism, under the one party and the one leader. It
borrowed the communist rhetoric against (false) bourgeois liberties and pluralist
democracy, in favour of national unity, independence, economic development
and prosperity. Through land reforms and welfare measures it mobilised the
population in seeming support of the party and the leader. The nationalisation
of the Suez Canal in 1956 and the subsequent war from which Nasser seemed
to emerge victorious gave him tremendous credit and popularity with the
Egyptian and Arab public. His portraits were hung in offi ces, cafés and homes
with genuine enthusiasm and not just to avoid trouble. At the same time, the
authoritarian state established by Nasser, and its parallels elsewhere, spawned
new systems of patronage and particularistic politics. The effects of land reform
and nationalisation were to eliminate autonomous social centres of power based
on property. They also had the effect of blocking the processes of ‘class struggle’
that would generate ideological and solidarity oriented political organisations
(Owen 1992: 32–52). These latter were, in any case, banned and suppressed.
Civil associations, trade unions and professional associations were either banned
or incorporated into the state or its unique party. People were then deprived of
avenues of organisation and association to further interests, ideologies and social
presence. As such, individuals and groups were pushed into informal and
personalistic networks of kinship and patronage, linking them to government
bureaucracy and to nodes of the ‘black economy’ from which they could benefi t.
Diane Singerman (1995), among others, has argued that the common people
in Egypt do participate actively in politics, but a particular type of politics, that
of family, neighbourhood, the informal economy and their connection to state
bureaucracy through patronage and mutual favours. This is strongly reminis-
cent of the ‘pre-modern’ and universal politics of personal salvation through
allegiance to family, community and patrons, and is distinct from the modern
politics of ideology and organisation.^19
The demise of ideological parties was given another boost with the collapse
of communism in the late 1980s, making leftist ideologies and models less viable.
It also removed the Soviet camp as a source of inspiration and support to the
secular left. That, together with the suppression or restriction of other parties
and civil associations in most countries, opened the fi eld for Islamic political
activism. Although Islamic political parties or associations, such as the Muslim
Brotherhood, were also banned, their associations and networks could operate
through various avenues of religion and charity, as well as banks and businesses,
aided by connections to the oil-rich centres of Salafi Islam in Saudi Arabia and
the Gulf. These became particularly prominent in the infi tah period from the