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86 POLITICSWho is on the web worldwide?0123456789109/1/199711/1/19971/1/19983/1/19985/1/19987/1/19989/1/199811/1/19981/1/19993/1/19995/1/19997/1/19999/1/199911/1/19991/1/20003/1/20005/1/20007/1/20009/1/200011/1/20001/1/20013/1/20015/1/20017/1/20019/1/200111/1/20011/1/2002Percent of World PopulationFigure 2: Who is on the Web worldwide? (Data source: NUA Internet Surveys.)meetings are necessary to create a democracy that relies
upon what he calls “strong talk,” a democratic community
relying upon increased political participation via public
discussion and debate (Barber, 1984). Barber addresses
the problem of the “zookeeper” mentality of liberal
democracies: a system that acts more todefendindividual
preferences and liberty from one another thanpromote
shared commitments and civic engagement. The critical
missing element, Barber believes, is greater participation.
Citizens in most liberal democracies are only “free” every
2, 4, or 6 years—only when they vote.
Whether or not we agree with Barber, few would as-
sert that greater civic participation poses a problem for
republican democracy. Though James Madison argues in
Federalist 10(Hamilton, Madison, & Jay, 1961) that the
public opinion of a majority must be filtered by a repub-
lican government, nearly everyone agrees that greater in-
volvement in the political and civic sphere adds to the
credibility of liberal democracy and that current levels of
disengagement in the U.S. are a serious area of concern
(Putnam, 2000). However, Barber’s strong talk, Putnam’s
“social capital,” and other participation-inducing devices
have always encountered problems with real world appli-
cation: the seeming irrationality of political participation.
Within political science, the dominant perspective for
understanding political participation isrational choice.
According to this view, a rational individual chooses
whether to engage in political activity (writing a letter,
joining a protest march, voting, etc.) only if the benefits
exceed the costs. The argument is deceptively simple, but
leads to powerful conclusions:Participate (e.g., Vote) only ifProbability∗Benefits
−Costs> 0.Verbally, this equation tells us that individuals engage in
a particular political act if thebenefits(say, a particular
candidate winning office) exceed thecostsof participa-
tion. Even stated this way, ignoring the other elements,
participation looks irrational. The direct benefits to most
individuals of, say, George Bush winning the presidency
are quite low. These are quickly overwhelmed by the costs
of being informed, registering to vote, and actually getting
to the polling place and casting a ballot.
The problem becomes insurmountable when we add
the“probability”term. This term captures what social sci-
entists refer to as the “collective action problem.” An elec-
tion outcome, such as a Bush victory, is a “public good.”
Public goods, such as clean water or clean air, are defined
as goods that everyone can enjoy, regardless of whether
or not he or she helped provide the good. An election
outcome is a “good” (or “bad” for those on the losing
side) which we “enjoy” whether or not we voted. Thus,
unless we believe that our single vote will be decisive in
the outcome—represented as“probability”above—then
we are better off staying at home. In most elections the
value ofprobabilityis vanishingly small. The rational cit-
izen should not vote, and certainly should not engage in
Barber’s strong democracy. This is, of course, the Achilles
heel for this theory, because many peopledovote. As a
consequence, some scholars have posited a “consumptive”
benefit to participation (aDutyterm), something that we
enjoy whether or not our candidate wins. Although for
some, the inclusion ofDutysolves the puzzle of participa-
tion, for others, this reveals the poverty of this approach
to political action. For a summary of the rational choice
theory of voting, see Aldrich (1993). For a critique of this
viewpoint, see Green and Shapiro (1996).
Regardless of the debate, the fact remains that the
“equation of political participation” provides a structured