132 THE BiG DROP
Our group of about a dozen experts met behind closed
doors at a think tank on M Street in downtown Washington.
We operated under Chatham House Rules, which means that
participants cannot be mentioned or quoted by name. But, it
is permitted to describe the tone and substance of the conver-
sation. Included around the table were subject matter experts
and former officials from the State Department, Defense
Department, U.S. Treasury, White House National Security
Council, and CIA.
It was the perfect mix of defense, diplomacy, finance and
intelligence. Our mission was to evaluate the economic sanc-
tions currently in place against Russia and to develop recom-
mendations for changes in sanctions policy if needed. These
recommendations would later be made public with a view
to influencing sanctions policy either in the current or next
White House administration.
This is the kind of work that has enormous implications for
investors and their portfolios, but which is too often unknown
to the Wall Street analysts on whom investors rely. At Strategic
Intelligence, our goal is to synthesize geopolitics with capital
markets expertise so that investors are not blindsided by geo-
political earthquakes that seem far removed from the quotidian
concerns of finance.
Our discussion began on a note of frustration from the as-
sembled experts that U.S. economic sanctions had not produced
any change in Russian behavior. The U.S. and most of its allies
were unhappy with the Russian takeover of Crimea, but were
prepared to live with that outcome for various historic and stra-
tegic reasons. Crimea has historically been part of Russia and
the Russia Black Sea Fleet, the only warm-water fleet in Russia,
was based there. Putin’s methods in securing Russian interests
in Crimea were blunt, but effective, and NATO seemed willing
to treat it as a fait accompli. But Russian support for rebel forces
in Eastern Ukraine, including the use of Russian troops and