Sewall Wright 97many cases, practically irreducible probabilities like those in the fall of dice (or
segregation and assortment of genes). The deterministic expressions do not lose
their usefulness as approximations. What we are given is a tenable philosophy
of science and along with this a desirable humility in the recognition that science
is a limited venture, concerned with the external and statistical aspects of events
and incapable of dealing with the unique creative aspect of each individual event”
[Wright, 1964]. Similar ideas are in[Wright, 1978]. Wright freely admitted that
his philosophy had no influence on his every day practice of science.
Biologists have greeted this work with disagreement, or more often, with indif-
ference. Many biologists regard the mind-body problem as something to avoid,
better left to philosophers. Others regard mind as something growing out of mat-
ter, requiring only a certain level of organizational complexity. Most, I think,
regard the mind as composed of constituents that cannot think at all. Wright did,
however, find agreement from some philosophers, notably his long time friend,
Charles Hartshorne.
Wright’s 1964 paper[Wright, 1964]was written in honor of Hartshorne.
8 WRIGHT, THE MANThose who knew Wright from his early days say that he was always somewhat
shy and introverted. He had absolutely no small talk, and it was difficult to have
a casual conversation with him. In contrast, if the subject was serious, he could
and would go on at great length. The topic could be history — including his early
days surveying; his ancestors (he enjoyed mentioning that he was a descendant of
Samuel Sewall, of Salem witchcraft fame); politics, on which he had strong opinions
(he detested Nixon); and of course any kind of science. His intellectual interests
extended beyond the usual range. He had limitations in aesthetics, however. He
sometimes remarked that he had no interest in poetry, something that disappointed
his father.
Wright was an unusually kindly man, always willing to help. No doubt he hurt
his own career by spending inordinate amounts of time helping others; usually
this involved a complete reanalysis of the data. He took manuscript reviewing
extremely seriously. On one occasion in which I was involved as an editor, he
reanalyzed the data and reached a conclusion opposite to that of the author. The
author simply changed the conclusion.
Although Wright was kindly to almost everyone, there were two exceptions. One
was R. A. Fisher, with whom he disagreed about several evolutionary points. For
some reason not apparent to outsiders, the difference became intensely personal,
and they avoided each other. Wright also complained about Ernst Mayr, who he
said did not understand his (Wright’s) work. Usually, however, he could see good
in almost everyone and every paper. Often he had insights deeper and better than
the original author.
Wright routinely used a desktop mechanical calculator and eschewed the use of
electronic computers. Finally the Genetics Department bought him an electronic