Evolution and Normativity 209
epistemology and traditional ethics remains the justificational questions of
the tradition. Evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary ethics supple-
ment this account with an evolutionary account of the origin origins and
development of norms. Campbell [1974] defends this view of epistemology.
Westermarck’s monumentalThe Origin and Development of Moral Ideasis
the classic here for ethics. Darwin’s treatment of morality inThe Descent of
Manfalls roughly into this category.
- Evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary ethics might be seen assucces-
sor disciplinesto the traditions. On this reading, the evolutionary accounts
do not address the traditional questions of traditional epistemology because
it deems them irrelevant or unanswerable or uninteresting. Munz [1985] and
Dewey [1910] are epistemological example of this position. Wilson [1978],
Ruse [1986] and Ruse and Wilson [1986] defend this view for evolutionary
ethics.
Obviously, the weight one attaches to evolutionary considerations in addressing
the fundamental questions of normativity will depend on how one sees the rela-
tionship between the traditional accounts and the evolutionary accounts. I am
not sure how one is supposed to defend one approach at the expense of another.
For my own part, I think that a proper appreciation of our Darwinian heritage
commits us to a hybrid version of option (1) and option (3). On the one hand, the
evolutionary accounts do not merely contribute to our descriptive understanding
of the emergence of norms but also attempt to address the prescriptive dimensions
as well. On the other hand, the evolutionary perspective challenges some tradi-
tional notions of what counts as a ‘justification’ and thereby endorses a new vision
of how we are to understand norms.
2.2 Substantive Considerations
Do evolutionary considerations tell us anything about the emergence of
norms?
The evolution of moral norms.
In theDescent of Man, Darwin speculated on the origins of what he called our
‘moral sense.’ He argued that other intelligent organisms, were there any, would
acquire a moral sense other than our own. Darwin cites the case of the hive-bees
who might well support fratricide (Descent, chapter 4). According to Darwin, and
I daresay, contemporary sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists, the kind
of organisms we are determines, in a broad sense, what kinds of norms we are
likely to develop and endorse. This has both a positive and negative aspect.
On the positive side, given our social natures and the need for communal support
in the raising of children, human beings have evolved altruistic motivations that
temper inclinations toward self interest. We can well imagine, in the spirit of