210 Michael Bradie
Darwin, that other creatures that are intelligent but self reliant would not be
moved by considerations of sympathy and empathy with their fellow kind.
On the negative side, just as the Naturalistic Fallacy suggests that ‘is’ does not
imply ‘ought,’ it is often pointed out in ethical circles that ‘ought’ implies ‘can.’
The idea is that no norms that require what is impossible can be binding on us. So,
for instance, it is folly to establish or endorse norms that are beyond our capacity
to obey. The norm “Thou shalt not kill” seems perfectly proper while the norm
“Thou shalt not eat” seems ludicrous. There are limitations to the expectations we
can have for ourselves and for others. These limitations are a result of our limited
physical, emotional and intellectual capacities. But these limits are the fruits of
our evolutionary progress. So, it seems reasonable that the evolved limitations
of our physical and mental capabilities ar relevant to determining or setting the
boundaries of our normative demands.
Some moral theorists might take exception to the above conclusion. A God-
centered ethics might argue that the limitations of human beings are the reflection
of original sin or something of the sort and that this just shows that human beings
need to resign themselves to the will of their Maker. A secularized version of such
an ethic can be found in Kant who postulates an ideal Kingdom of Ends as the
(ultimately) unachievable model for human moral behavior. These concerns can
not be easily dismissed although I do not propose to pursue them here. Instead I
commend to your attention James Rachels’Created from Animalswhich explores
the implications of Darwinism for formulating a moral theory and effectively calls
into question both theologically based and Kantian ethical positions.
Rachels’ book is one long argument to the effect that Darwinism undermines the
concept of human dignity that he claims forms the basis for traditional moralities.
This, in turn, has implications for the moral status of animals. Rachels takes what
he calls the traditional concept of human dignity to be the presumption that the
primary purpose of morality is the “protection of human beings and their rights
and interests” [Rachels, 1990]. This presumption is supported by certain factual
(or quasi-factual) assumptions about human nature. Two basic claims emerge
from this factual base and support the sanctity of human dignity. One is the
presumption that human beings were created (as special) in the image of God.
Rachels calls this the “image of God thesis.” The second is the presumption that
human beings alone among the animals are rational beings. It does not follow
logically from these presumptions that human dignity is or ought to be the lynch
pin of morality. But, Rachels argues, the primacy of human dignity does rest on
and is supported by these presumptions. They serve, as it were, as the rationale
for putting human concerns ahead of all others in matters of morals.
Darwinism indirectly undermines the primacy of human dignity by undermining
the presumptions that support the doctrine. The Darwinian perspective marginal-
izes God as the creator of human beings as special. Although Darwinism does not
entail that God did not create human beings as special, it renders the story super-
fluous or suspect.^1 From the Darwinian perspective, humans are just one among
(^1) If one does think the theory of evolution entails that God did not create human beings as