Evolution and Normativity 211the animals. The Darwinian theory of common descent suggests that all organisms
are interrelated. Darwinian gradualism suggests that differences between species
are often matters of degree and not matters of kind. These implications undermine
the status of human beings as special and in so doing undermine the traditional
moralities which are based on that explicit or implicit assumption.
To replace the discarded image with something of value, Rachels proposes a view
he calls “moral individualism.” Moral individualism treats all individuals, human
or not, as individuals and not as members of a certain species. Considerations of
moral relevance are to be determined by circumstances and not by fiat. Rather
than pursue that development here I want to note that Rachels’ argument is not
intended merely to replace one set of moral norms by others but that it calls into
question some of the fundamental assumptions that lie behind any norms. This
takes us into the realm of the meta-ethical.
What, if anything, are the implications of Darwinism for meta-ethics? The
verdict is still out but one can find adherents of a wide diversity of views. Michael
Ruse, for one, has argued that a Darwinian approach to ethics rules out any form
of moral realism in favour of an “error” theory of the form first promoted by David
Hume [Ruse, 1986]. This has led to a vigorous debate in the literature with no
clear resolution in sight.
One might argue that Darwinism lends itself to moral realism by adapting an
argument formulated by Donald Campbell with respect to human cognitive facul-
ties. Campbell argues that just as the physical environment shapes the evolution
of organismic features, so the physical environment is held to shape the evolu-
tion of what we know [Campbell, 1974]. Our cognitive faculties and our scientific
theories ‘fit’ our physical environments in much the same way the organisms in
successful lineages are co-adapted to their environments. If our cognitive abilities
and guesses about the world we live in were not on the mark more often than not
we would be on the road to extinction. There is a congenial reciprocity between
what we think and how we think and what we think about. Campbell calls this
view ‘critical realism’ and thinks that a Darwinian viewpoint is committed to it.
I have some reservations about this argument in its guise as an account of the
evolution of our cognitive capacities but, were one persuaded by it, it might be
invoked as a defense of the contention that Darwinism is committed to or, at least,
is compatible with some form of moral realism.
If we understand a minimal version of moral realism to be committed to the
view that there are ‘moral facts’ in the world (whatever that might mean) then
we can well imagine that the ‘moral environment’ might shape the evolution of
our moral capacities and moral norms in much the same manner as the physical
environment is held to shape our cognitive capacities and cognitive norms. I’m not
sure how far this argument can be pushed but it seems that the cognitive realm
and the moral realm are,prima facie, on a par and if an evolutionary argument
for criticalphysicalrealism can be made then perhaps an evolutionary argument
special, one need only reflect on the possibility that the entire evolutionary process is just God’s
way of insuring the specialness of human beings through “secondary causes.”