238 Catherine Wilson
dangerous); like sweet and salty foods (they contain rare and needed nutrients);
and even why psychopathic leaders can dominate entire countries (we are disposed
to trust people who appear confident). Natural selection can also presumably ex-
plain why we like stimulants and depressants such as alcohol, caffeine and tobacco;
this liking is a byproduct of chemical receptors evolved for other vital purposes.
Parent-offspring conflict in adolescence, and the intergenerational hostility that
results not only in the complex sanctions placed on young people’s desires, but in
young men being sent to war, to the distress of their mothers, by older men, has a
rather obvious potential explanation in terms of reproductive competition. Even
the liking for risky behaviour on the part of young men, the cause of so many
social problems, may have an explanation in these terms. (Such behaviour is often
said to stem from a desire to impress women, who are presumably impressed, but,
recalling Dawkins’s observation that stereotypical behaviour is not always in the
interests of the organism performing it, a more subtle explanation might cite peer
pressure as a form of victimization intended to eliminate potential competitors
from the breeding community. )
Nevertheless, the traditionalist will insist, the supposition that some human
traits were adaptive in the past, or gave their possessors a reproductive edge,
and that some patterns of behaviour represent evolutionarily stable strategies, or
correspond to various types of durable polymorphism, can have no implications
for prescriptive moral theory. According to the terms of G. E. Moore’s Open
Question Argument [Moore, 1903, Ch. 1], we are always in a position to say “I
appreciate that behaviour pattern X represents an ESS, but why is X morally
good?” or “I appreciate that behaviour pattern Y is fitness-inducing and predicts
a larger future lineage than its competitor patterns, but does this mean that Y
is morally permissible?” Why does it matter, the skeptic will ask, whether some
form of behaviour that is subject to moral regulation, whether aggression, lust,
lying, selfishness or neglect, is an element of a human survival-and-reproduction-
strategy or the result of interaction between a talking serpent and Adam and Eve?
When it is argued that because “[t]he Darwinian does not expect you to feel guilt
about spending money on your children rather than sending it all to Oxfam”,
that you are right not to feel guilt and that you are not obliged to send it all to
Oxfam [Ruse, 1986, 239], it is evident that another premise is needed, though the
conclusion is clearly true.
To bridge the gap between “is” and “ought” and establish the very possibility
of Evolutionary Ethics, some guiding principle is required, and the best candidate
would seem to be the following:
Is-to-Ought-Principle: Since behaviour patterns in a species that have
arisen as a result of selective pressures are apt to be pleasurable and
satisfying to the organisms engaging in them, supported by redundant
mechanisms, and overprogrammed or difficult to extinguish, one ought
not try to suppress behaviour that can be shown to have arisen in the
course of evolution, unless there are strong reasons for doing so. Either
the attempt will likely produce stress if repression is successful, or it will