550 Karen Neander
notion of function, or in other words a notion of function that underwrites talk
of malfunction and that is construed as a notion of what traits or items are for.
This is usually understood in terms of an etiological theory, often referred to as a
selected effect (SE) theory of functions [Wright, 1973; Millikan, 1989b; Neander,
1991] according which functions are what items were selected for. In the case
of artifacts, the functions are said to result from intentional selection (e.g., what
something was designed for). In the case of natural functions, the functions are
said to result from a natural process of selection (e.g., ordinary natural or genic
selection). In his entry on functions in this volume, Timothy Lewens, calls this
kind of function talk “heavy function talk”.
There is no knockdown argument for any theory of mental content and if a
version of teleosemantics is to win its contest with competing theories it has to
win on points, all things considered. However, there is a methodological reason for
thinking that some version of teleosemantics is probably correct, or more modestly
that teleosemantics at least deserves an especially long, hard look. I explain this
reason here, after first saying more about the problem of intentionality and the
teleosemantic response to it, and then I review some problems that teleosemantic
theories face.
2 FUNCTIONAL AND SEMANTIC NORMSThere are a number of different teleological theories of mental content. I don’t
explain any of them here in full detail, but it’s central to all of them that a certain
normative notion of function underwrites a certain normative notion of content.
I’ll say something about the latter notion, something about the former notion, and
then something about how the two can be brought together.
Content is said to be normative because some mental states that have content
can represent correctly or they can misrepresent. The capacity to misrepresent
distinguishes representing from mere carrying of information. One seminal pre-
sentation of this idea is found in H. P. Grice [1957]. As he says, dark clouds can
“mean” that a storm is on its way, but only if a storm is on its way. While a
hiker can misunderstand the significance of the clouds, the clouds themselves can-
not misrepresent an approaching storm. If there was no storm approaching, the
clouds never meant one was. Similarly, Johnny’s spots can “mean” that Johnny
has the measles, but only if Johnny has the measles. The doctor can misunder-
stand the significance of the spots, but the spots themselves cannot misrepresent
the measles. If Johnny doesn’t have the measles, his spots never meant he had.
Grice contrasts the significance of natural signs (which he calls “natural mean-
ing”) with the meaning of the doctor’s words (which he calls “non-natural mean-
ing”). The doctor’s words, “Johnny has the measles”, can mean that Johnny
has the measles even if he does not have them. While Grice does not focus on
the fact, the same is true of the doctor’s thought that Johnny has the measles.
The doctor’s thought can have the content that Johnny has the measles even if
Johnny doesn’t. In sum, linguistic utterances and mental representations do more