this, since both 101 and 103 drove down
Lilla Tvärgatan. The paint section adjoins the
ironmongery and gardening sections.^5
Pumping appliance 101 parks outside the
department store at Strorgatan 68, behind
ladder appliance 103, which is set up outside
the entrance to Storgatan 66. This entrance
leads via a flight of stairs up to offices above
the department store. It is also the personnel
entrance for a hotel. BA firefighters prepare
themselves and then go into the ironmongery
section with the aim of entering the paint
store, which is now fully ablaze. There is an
extreme amount of smoke and when the unit
reaches the stairs up to the paint section they
see that this section, which is above the paint
store, is now also ablaze. They report this
to the BA unit commander. They then open
the door to the paint store and attempt to
extinguish the flames. Within a short time
they are forced to give up their attempt due
to excessive smoke and heat. They pull back
to the entrance of the ironmongery section
closer to Storgatan. The paint section above
the paint store is by this time fully ablaze. It
is now just after 05.30.
On the basis of information received from
the BA unit, Andersson has gone round to the
other side of the building, to Drottninggatan,
and can see for himself that the paint section
is ablaze.^6
At about this time pumping appliance
102 with a commander and two firefighters,
aerial appliance 104 with one firefighter, and
command vehicle 106 with Olsson and one
firefighter arrive. 106 enters the square and
Andersson hurries towards Olsson. Andersson
reports the situation to him.^7
Olsson says, ‘Ok! I’ll take over as incident
commander now.’^8
Olsson is fairly familiar with the floor
layout in the building since he has recently
carried out an inspection there. It was built
at the end of the 19th century. Fire safegu-
ards have been improved in connection with
a renovation and repair work but it is a woo-
den beamed building. There are also some old
(^5) As geographical aspects among
others limit how much a person can
see (purely visually), one should try to
apply all the senses, rational thought
and creativity. A diffuse picture of a
situation and the course of events can
create significant problems for the
subsequent work. In relation to this,
one should also always be prepared for
the unexpected, surprises that should,
as much as possible, be avoided by,
among other things, trying to gain
as good and balanced a picture of the
situation as possible.
(^6) Firefighters who are on the ‘front
line’ are partly the eyes and ears of the
commander and should therefore be
consciously observant and report back
relevant information. The incident
commander should also, when pos
sible, confirm information and gain a
personal picture of the situation.(^7) In some situations it can be bene
ficial to use appropriate templates, -
e.g. for situation reports, so that both
the sender and the receiver work on
the same basis. At the same time it is
necessary to be careful with the use
of such templates and, as in this case,
the type of information that is supp
lied. Templates must only provide a -
means to an end; they are not an end
in themselves.
(^8) Role allocation at an incident site
must be uniform and clear, to all con
- cerned. When authority is transferred
from one commander to another, one’s
role can become unclear. There should,
therefore, be a well prepared plan in
place for the allocation of roles, tasks
and authority during a response opera
tion. These roles, tasks and authority
should be logical and align with the
roles, tasks and authority that ‘nor
mally’ exist in the organisation’s role
logic. The organisation at an incident
site should develop on the basis of
the problem(s) to be solved and must
be flexible in order to adapt to these
problems.