(2) This theory destroys the distinction between good and
evil. Since the good is whatever the individual pleases, and
since the pleasure of one individual is the {219} displeasure
of another, the same thing is both good and evil at the same
time, good for one person and evil for another. Good and
evil are therefore not distinct. They are the same.
(3) Pleasure is the satisfaction of our desires. Desires are
merely feelings. This theory, therefore, founds morality
upon feeling. But an objective morality cannot be founded
upon what is peculiar to individuals. If the moral code is to
be a law binding upon all men, it can only be founded upon
that which is common to all men, the universal reason.
(4) The end of moral activity must fall within, and not out-
side, the moral act itself. Morality must have an intrinsic,
not a merely extrinsic, value. We must not do right for
the sake of something else. We must do right because it is
right, and thus make virtue an end in itself. But the So-
phistic theory places the end of morality outside morality.
We are to do right, not for its own sake, but for the sake of
pleasure. Morality is thus not an end in itself, but merely
a means towards a further end.
Virtue, therefore, is not pleasure, any more than knowl-
edge is perception. Likewise, just as knowledge is not right
opinion, so virtue is not right action. Right opinion may
be held upon wrong grounds, and right action may be per-
formed on wrong grounds. For true virtue we must not
only know what is right, but why it is right. True virtue
is thus right action proceeding from a rational comprehen-
sion of true values. Hence there arises in Plato’s philoso-
phy a distinction between philosophic virtue and customary
virtue. Philosophic virtue is founded upon reason, and un-
derstands the {220} principle on which it acts. It is, in
fact, action governed by principles. Customary virtue is
right action proceeding from any other grounds, such as
custom, habit, tradition, good impulses, benevolent feel-
ings, instinctive goodness. Men do right merely because
other people do it, because it is customary, and they do
it without understanding the reasons for it. This is the
virtue of the ordinary honest citizen, the “respectable” per-
son. It is the virtue of bees and ants, who act as if ra-
tionally, but without any understanding of what they are
doing. And Plato observes—no doubt with an intentional
spice of humour—that such people may in the next life find
themselves born as bees and ants. Plato denies philosophic
virtue not only to the masses of men, but even to the best
statesmen and politicians of Greece.As true virtue is virtue which knows at what it is aiming,
the knowledge of the nature of the highest aim becomes the
chief question of ethics. What is the end of moral activity?
Now we have just seen that that end must fall within, and
not outside, the moral act. The end of goodness is the good.
What, then, is the good? What is the supreme good, the
summum bonum?A note of warning is necessary before we enter upon the de-
tails of this problem. Plato frequently speaks of all moral
activity aiming at, and ending in, happiness. With mod-
ern phrases ringing in our ears, we might easily suppose
this to mean that Plato is a utilitarian. The utilitarian-
ism of Bentham and Mill is distinguished by the fact that