others.
The result is that Plato’ssummum bonumis not a single
{223} end. It is a compound consisting of four parts. First,
and chief of all, is the knowledge of the Ideas as they are
in themselves, philosophy. Secondly, the contemplation of
the Ideas as they reveal themselves in the world of sense,
the love and appreciation of all that is beautiful, ordered,
and harmonious. Thirdly, the cultivation of the special
sciences and arts. And fourthly, indulgence in pure, refined,
and innocent pleasures of the senses, excluding, of course,
whatever is base and evil.
Plato had also a specific doctrine of virtue. As already
stated, he distinguished between philosophic and custom-
ary virtue, and attached absolute value only to the former.
He does not, however, deny a relative value to customary
virtue, inasmuch as it is a means towards true virtue. Plato
saw that man cannot rise at one bound to the pinnacles of
rational virtue. He must needs pass through the prepara-
tory stage of customary virtue. In the man in whom reason
is not yet awakened, good habits and customs must be im-
planted, in order that, when reason comes, it may find the
ground ready prepared.
Socrates had taught that virtue is one. And Plato in his
earlier writings adopted this view. But later on he came
to see that every faculty of man has its place and its func-
tion, and the due performance of its function is a virtue.
He did not, however, surrender the unity of virtue alto-
gether, but believed that its unity is compatible with its
plurality. There are four cardinal virtues. Three of these
correspond to the three parts of the soul, and the fourth
is the unity of the others. The virtue of reason is wis-
dom, of the noble half of {224} the mortal soul courage, of
the ignoble appetites, temperance or self-control, in which
the passions allow themselves to be governed by reason.
The fourth virtue, justice, arises from the others. Justice
means proportion and harmony, and accrues to the soul
when all three parts perform their functions and co-operate
with each other.Following Zeller, we may add to this account of the virtues
some of Plato’s views upon the details of life. And first, his
opinion of women and marriage. Here Plato does not rise
above the level of ordinary Greek morals. He has nothing
specially original to say, but reflects the opinions of his age.
Women he regards as essentially inferior to men. Moreover,
the modern view of woman as the complement of man, as
possessing those special virtues of womanliness, which a
man lacks, is quite alien to Plato. The difference between
men and women is, in his view, not one of kind but only
of degree. The only specific difference between the sexes
is the physical difference. Spiritually they are quite the
same, except that woman is inferior. Hence Plato would
not exclude women from the same education which man
receives. He would educate them in exactly the same way,
but this involves the imposition upon them of the same
burdens. Even military duties are not outside the sphere
of women.His views of marriage flow from the same principle. Since
woman is not the complement of man, she is in no special
sense fitted to be his companion. Hence the ideal of spiri-