to philosophy is even more evident. The end of all educa-
tion is the knowledge of the Ideas, and every other subject,
science, mathematics, art, is introduced into the {231} ed-
ucational curriculum solely as a preparation for that end.
They have no value in themselves. This is obvious from
the teaching of the “Republic,” and it is even more evident
in the “Symposium,” where the love of beautiful objects is
made to end, not in itself, but in philosophy.
Plato’s low estimate of art appears also in his theory of
art as imitation, and his contemptuous references to the
nature of artistic genius. As to the first, art is, to him,
only imitation. It is the copy of an object of the senses,
and this again is only a copy of an Idea. Hence a work of
art is only a copy of a copy. Plato did not recognise the
creativeness of art. This view is certainly false. If the aims
of art were merely to imitate, a photograph would be the
best picture, since it is the most accurate copy of its object.
What Plato failed to see was that the artist does not copy
his object, but idealizes it. And this means that he does
not see the object simply as an object, but as the revelation
of an Idea. He does not see the phenomenon with the eyes
of other men, but penetrates the sensuous envelope and
exhibits the Idea shining through the veils of sense.
The second point is Plato’s estimate of artistic genius. The
artist does not work by reason, but by inspiration. He does
not, or he should not, create the beautiful by means of rules,
or by the application of principles. It is only after the work
of art is created that the critic discovers rules in it. This
does not mean that the discovery of rules is false, but that
the artist follows them unconsciously and instinctively. If,
for example, we believe Aristotle’s dictum that the object
of tragedy {232} is to purge the heart by terror and pity,
we do not mean that the tragedian deliberately sets out to
accomplish that end. He does so without knowing or in-
tending it. And this kind of instinctive impulse we call the
inspiration of the artist. Now Plato fully recognizes these
facts. But far from considering inspiration something ex-
alted, he thinks it, on the contrary, comparatively low and
contemptible, just because it is not rational. He calls it “di-
vine madness,” divine indeed, because the artist produces
beautiful things, but madness because he himself does not
know how or why he has done it. The poet says very wise
and beautiful things, but he does not know why they are
wise and beautiful. He merely feels, and does not under-
stand anything. His inspiration, therefore, is not on the
level of knowledge, but only of right opinion, which knows
what is true, but does not know why.Plato’s views of art are thus not satisfactory. He is doubt-
less right in placing inspiration below reason, and art below
philosophy. They do stand to each other in the relation of
higher and lower. Not that such a question can be de-
cided by mere personal preferences. The usual discussions
whether art or philosophy is better, whether emotion or
reason is higher, are pointless and insipid, because the dis-
putants merely exalt their personal peculiarities. The man
of artistic temperament naturally prefers art, and says it
is the highest. The philosopher exalts philosophy above
art, merely because it is his pet hobby. This kind of dis-
cussion is futile. The matter must be decided upon some
principle. And the principle is quite clear. Both art and