atively modern times. His name therefore is more espe-
cially associated with deductive logic, of which he was the
founder. He not only founded the science, but practically
completed it. What we now know as “formal logic,” what is
to this day contained in all text-books, taught in all schools
and universities, is, in all its essentials, nothing more than
the logic of Aristotle. His writings upon the subject in-
clude the treatment of the well-known laws of thought, the
doctrine of the ten categories, the five predicables, the doc-
trines of terms, of propositions, of syllogisms, and of the
reduction of the other figures to the first figure of the syllo-
gism. And these heads might well form the list of contents
of a modern work on formal logic. In only two respects has
any advance been made upon Aristotle by subsequent logi-
cians. The fourth figure of the syllogism is not recognized
by Aristotle; and he dealt only with categorical syllogisms,
and does not treat conditional syllogisms. But whether
or not the fourth figure of the syllogism has any value is
still a matter open to dispute. And though the doctrine
of conditional syllogisms is important, it is not essential,
because all conditional syllogisms can be reduced to cate-
gorical {261} syllogisms. The categorical syllogism is the
fundamental type of reasoning, to which every other form of
deduction can be reduced. As for the rest of the huge trea-
tises on formal logic which some moderns have produced,
the supposed additions are nothing but wearisome, endless,
useless, nauseating, academic distinctions and refinements,
which are much better forgotten than remembered. Aris-
totle’s logic contains therefore all that is essential to the
subject. The only ground on which it can be attacked is
its wholly empirical procedure. But that is another story.
As a collection, arrangement, and analysis of the facts of
reason, it is to all intents and purposes finality achieved at
one stroke.- Metaphysics.
The treatise now known as the “Metaphysics” of Aristotle
did not originally bear that name. Aristotle’s name for this
subject is “first philosophy,” by which he means the knowl-
edge of the first, highest, or most general principles of the
universe. All other branches of knowledge are subordinate
to this science, not because they are inferior in value, but
because they are lower in logical sequence as dealing with
principles less universal in their scope. Thus all the special
sciences deal with one or another particular sphere of be-
ing, but the “first philosophy” has for its subject being as
such, “being so far forth as it is being.” It studies, not the
characteristics of this or that kind of being, but the princi-
ples which are equally true of all being. The laws of Zoology
apply only to animals, but the principles of the “first philos-
ophy” apply to everything. The name “metaphysics” came
into use only half a century B.C., when {262} Andronicus
published a complete edition of Aristotle’s known works.
In this edition the treatise on “first philosophy” was placed
after the “physics,” and “metaphysics” signifies simply “af-
ter physics.” The derivation of the word thus appears to
be merely accidental and adventitious. Whether it was also
in any way intended to signify that the subject is “beyond
physics,” that is, deals with what transcends physical exis-
tence, seems doubtful.Aristotle’s metaphysical theory grows naturally out of his