controls it. The latter supposition is excluded by the fact
that God is not an existent conscious person, the former
by its own inherent absurdity. The only being upon this
earth who is conscious of his ends is man. Such animals
as bees and ants appear to work rationally, and their ac-
tivities are clearly governed by design. But it is not to be
supposed that they are reasoning beings. They attain their
ends instinctively. And when we come to inorganic matter,
we find that even here its movements are purposive, but no
one could suppose them deliberate and conscious. These
manifold activities of lower nature are indeed the work of
reason, but not of an existent or self-conscious reason. And
this means that instinct, and even mechanical forces such
as gravitation are, in their essence, reason. It is not that
they are created by reason, but that they are reason, ex-
hibiting itself in lower forms. In commenting upon Plato’s
dualism of sense and reason, I remarked that any true phi-
losophy, though recognizing the distinction between sense
and reason, must yet find room for their identity, and must
show that sense is but a lower form of reason. This idea
Aristotle thoroughly understood, and sought to show, not
merely that sense is reason, but even that the activities of
inorganic matter, such as gravitation, are so. In the result,
nature, though working through reason, is not conscious of
the fact, does so blindly and instinctively, and is compared
to a creative artist, who forms beautiful objects by instinct,
or, as we should say, by inspiration, without setting before
his mind the end to be attained or the rules to be observed
in order to attain it.
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In the process of nature, it is always form which impels,
matter which retards and obstructs. The entire world-
movement is the effort of form to mould matter, but, just
because matter has in itself a power of resistance, this effort
does not always succeed. This is the reason why form can-
not exist without matter, because it can never wholly over-
come the clogging activity of matter, and therefore matter
can never be wholly moulded into form. And this explains,
too, the occasional occurrence in nature of freaks, mon-
strosities, abortions, and unnatural births. In these the
form has failed to mould the matter. Nature has failed to
attain her ends. Science, therefore, should study the nor-
mal and natural rather than the abnormal and monstrous.
For it is in the normal that the ends of nature are to be
seen, and through them alone nature can be understood.
Aristotle is fond of using the words “natural” and “unnat-
ural,” but he uses them always with this special meaning.
That is natural which attains its end, that in which the
form successfully masters the matter.No doctrine of physics can ignore the fundamental notions
of motion, space, and time. Aristotle, therefore, finds it
necessary to consider these. Motion is the passage of mat-
ter into form, and it is of four kinds. The first is motion
which affects the substance of a thing, origination and de-
cease. Secondly, change of quality. Thirdly, change of quan-
tity, increase and decrease. Fourthly, locomotion, change
of place. Of these, the last is the most fundamental and
important.Aristotle rejects the definition of space as the void. Empty
space is an impossibility. Hence, too, he disagrees with the