alone could give finality to such a scheme. But it is the
principle itself which matters. And that it is one of the most
valuable conceptions in {308} philosophy will perhaps be
more evident if we compare it, firstly, with modern scientific
theories of evolution and secondly, with certain aspects of
Hindu pantheism.
What has Aristotle in common with such a writer a Her-
bert Spencer? According to Spencer, evolution is a move-
ment from the indefinite, incoherent, and homogeneous, to
the definite, coherent, and heterogeneous. Aristotle has all
this, though his words are different. He calls it a movement
from matter to form. Form he describes as whatever gives
definiteness to a thing. Matter is the indefinite substrate,
form gives it definiteness. Hence for him too the higher be-
ing is more definite because it has more form. That matter
is the homogeneous, form the heterogeneous, follows from
this. We saw that there are in matter itself no differences,
because there are no qualities. And this is the same as
saying it is homogeneous. Heterogeneity, that is, differenti-
ation, is introduced by form. Coherence is the same thing
as organization. Aristotle has himself defined the form of
a thing as its organization. For him, as for Spencer, the
higher being is simply that which is more organized. Ev-
ery theory of evolution depends fundamentally upon the
idea of organism. Aristotle invented the idea and the word.
Spencer carried it no further, though the more advanced
physical knowledge of his day enabled him to illustrate it
more copiously.
But of course the great difference between Aristotle and
the moderns, is that the former did not guess, what the
latter have discovered, namely that evolution is not only a
logical development, but is a fact in time. Aristotle knew
what was meant by the higher and lower organism as well
as Darwin, but he did not know, that the latter {309} actu-
ally turns into the former in the course of years. But this,
though the most obvious, is not really the most important
difference between Spencer and Aristotle. The real differ-
ence is that Aristotle penetrated far more deeply into the
philosophy of evolution than modern science does; that, in
fact, modern science has no philosophy of evolution at all.
For the fundamental problem here is, if we speak of higher
and lower beings, what rational ground have we for call-
ing them higher and lower? That the lower passes in time
into the higher is no doubt a very interesting fact to dis-
cover, but it dwindles into insignificance beside the problem
just indicated, because, on the solution of that problem it
depends whether the universe is to be regarded as futile,
meaningless, and irrational, or whether we are to see in it
order, plan, and purpose. Is Spencer’s doctrine a theory
of development at all? Or is it not rather simply a theory
of change? Something resembling an ape becomes a man.
Is there development here, that is, is it a movement from
something really lower to something really higher? Or is
it merely change from one indifferent thing to another? Is
there improvement, or only difference? In the latter case, it
makes not the slightest difference whether the ape becomes
man, or man becomes an ape. The one is as good as the
other. In either case, it is merely a change from Tweedle-
dum to Tweedledee. The change is meaningless, and has
no significance.