nature, every being has its proper end, and the attainment
of this end is its special function. Hence the good for each
being must be the adequate performance of its special func-
tion. The good for man will not consist in the pleasure of
the senses. Sensation is the special function of animals, but
not of man. Man’s special function is reason. Hence the
proper {316} activity of reason is thesummum bonum, the
good for man. Morality consists in the life of reason. But
what precisely that means we have still to see.
Man is not only a reasoning animal. As the higher being,
he contains within himself the faculties of the lower beings
also. Like plants he is appetitive, like animals, sensitive.
The passions and appetites are an organic part of his na-
ture. Hence virtue will be of two kinds. The highest virtues
will be found in the life of reason, and the life of thought,
philosophy. These intellectual virtues are called by Aris-
totle dianoetic. Secondly, the ethical virtues proper will
consist in the submission of the passions and appetites to
the control of reason. The dianoetic virtues are the higher,
because in them man’s special function alone is in oper-
ation, and also because the thinking man most resembles
God, whose life is a life of pure thought.
Happiness, therefore, consists in the combination of dia-
noetic and ethical virtues. They alone are of absolute value
to man. Yet, though he places happiness in virtue, Aris-
totle, in his broad and practical way, does not overlook
the fact that external goods and circumstances have a pro-
found influence upon happiness, and cannot be ignored, as
the Cynics attempted to ignore them. Not that Aristotle
regards externals as having any value in themselves. What
alone is good in itself, is an end in itself, is virtue. But
external goods help a man in his quest of virtue. Poverty,
sickness, and misfortune, on the other hand, hinder his ef-
forts. Therefore, though externals are not goods in them-
selves, they may be a means towards the good. Hence they
are not to be despised and rejected. Riches, friends, health,
{317} good fortune, are not happiness. But they are neg-
ative conditions of it. With them happiness is within our
grasp. Without them its attainment is difficult. They will
be valued accordingly.Aristotle says little in detail of the dianoetic virtues. And
we may turn at once to the main subject of his moral sys-
tem, the ethical virtues. These consist in the governance of
the passions by reason. Socrates was wrong in supposing
that virtue is purely intellectual, that nothing save knowl-
edge is needed for it, and that if a man thinks right he
must needs do right. He forgot the existence of the pas-
sions, which are not easily controlled. A man may reason
perfectly, his reason may point him to the right path, but
his passions may get the upper hand and lead him out of
it. How then is reason to gain control over the appetites?
Only by practice. It is only by continual effort, by the
constant exercise of self-control, that the unruly passions
can be tamed. Once brought under the yoke, their control
becomes habit. Aristotle lays the utmost emphasis on the
importance of habit in morality. It is only by cultivating
good habits that a man becomes good.Now if virtue consists in the control of the appetites by
reason, it thus contains two constituents, reason and ap-
petite. Both must be present. There must be passions, if