they are to be controlled. Hence the ascetic ideal of root-
ing out the passions altogether is fundamentally wrong. It
overlooks the fact that the higher form does not exclude the
lower—that were contrary to the conception of evolution—
it includes and transcends it. It forgets that the passions
are an organic part of man, and that to destroy them is
to do injury to his {318} nature by destroying one of its
essential members. The passions and appetites are, in fact,
the matter of virtue, reason its form, and the mistake of
asceticism is that it destroys the matter of virtue, and sup-
poses that the form can subsist by itself. Virtue means that
the appetites must be brought under control, not that they
must be eradicated. Hence there are two extremes to be
avoided. It is extreme, on the one hand, to attempt to up-
root the passions; and it is extreme, on the other, to allow
them to run riot. Virtue means moderation. It consists
in hitting the happy mean as regards the passions, in not
allowing them to get the upper hand of reason, and yet in
not being quite passionless and apathetic. From this fol-
lows the famous Aristotelian doctrine of virtue as the mean
between two extremes. Every virtue lies between two vices,
which are the excess and defect of appetite respectively.
What is the criterion here? Who is to judge? How are we to
know what is the proper mean in any matter? Mathemat-
ical analogies will not help us. It is not a case of drawing
a straight line from one extreme to the other, and finding
the middle point by bisection. And Aristotle refuses to lay
down any rule of thumb in the matter. There is no golden
rule by virtue of which we can tell where the proper mean
is. It all depends on circumstances, and on the person in-
volved. What is the proper mean in one case is not the
proper mean in another. What is moderate for one man
is immoderate for his neighbour. Hence the matter must
be left to the good judgment of the individual. A sort of
fine tact, good sense, is required to know the mean, which
Aristotle calls “insight.” This insight is both the cause and
the {319} effect of virtue. It is the cause, because he who
has it knows what he ought to do. It is the effect, because
it is only developed by practice. Virtue renders virtue easy.
Each time a man, by use of his insight, rightly decides upon
the mean, it becomes easier for him to discriminate next
time.Aristotle attempts no systematic classification of the
virtues, as Plato had done. This sort of schematism is con-
trary to the practical character of his thought. He sees that
life is far too complex to be treated in this way. The proper
mean is different in every different case, and therefore there
are as many virtues as there are circumstances in life. His
list of virtues, therefore, is not intended to be exhaustive. It
is merely illustrative. Though the number of virtues is infi-
nite, there are certain well-recognized kinds of good action,
which are of such constant importance in life that they have
received names. By the example of some of these virtues
Aristotle illustrates his doctrine of the mean. For instance,
courage is the mean between cowardice and rashness. That
is to say, cowardice is the defect of boldness, rashness the
excess, courage the reasonable medium. Munificence is the
mean between pettiness and vulgar profusion, good temper
between spiritlessness and irascibility, politeness between
rudeness and obsequiousness, modesty between shameless-