such as a straight line, we may consider it, in the first place,
as one. In that case it is a continuous indivisible unit. Next
we may regard it as many, in which case it falls into parts.
Now each of these parts may again be regarded as one, and
as such is an indivisible unit; and again each part may be
regarded as many, in which case it falls into further parts;
and this alternating process may go on for ever. This is the
view of the matter which gives rise to the contradictions we
have been considering. But it is a false view. It involves the
false abstraction of first regarding the many as something
that has reality apart from the one, and then regarding the
one as something that has reality apart from the many. If
you persist in saying that the line is simply one and not
many, then there arises the theory of indivisible units. If
you {60} persist in saying it is simply many and not one,
then it is divisiblead infinitum. But the truth is that it is
neither simply many nor simply one; it is a many in one,
that is, it is aquantity. Both sides of the contradiction are,
therefore, in one sense true, for each is a factor of the truth.
But both sides are also false, if and in so far as, each sets
itself up as the whole truth.
Critical Remarks on Eleaticism.
The consideration of the meaning of Zeno’s doctrine will
give us an insight into the essentials of the position of the
Eleatics. Zeno said that motion and multiplicity are not
real. Now what does this mean? Did Zeno mean to say
that when he walked about the streets of Elea, it was not
true that he walked about? Did he mean that it was not a
fact that he moved from place to place? When I move my
arms, did he mean that I am not moving my arms, but that
they really remain at rest all the time? If so, we might justly
conclude that this philosophy is a mere craze of speculation
run mad, or else a joke. But this is not what is meant. The
Eleatic position is that though the world of sense, of which
multiplicity and motion are essential features, may exist,
yet that outward world is not the true Being. They do not
deny that the world exists. They do not deny that mo-
tion exists or that multiplicity exists. These things no sane
man can deny. The existence of motion and multiplicity
is, as Hegel says, as sensuously certain as the existence of
elephants. Zeno, then, does not deny the existence of the
world. What he denies is the truth of existence. What he
means is: certainly there is motion and multiplicity; cer-
tainly the world is here, is present to our senses, but it is
not the true world. It is {61} not reality. It is mere appear-
ance, illusion, an outward show and sham, a hollow mask
which hides the real being of things. You may ask what is
meant by this distinction between appearance and reality.
Is not even an appearance real? It appears. It exists. Even
a delusion exists, and is therefore a real thing. So is not
the distinction between appearance and reality itself mean-
ingless? Now all this is perfectly true, but it does not com-
prehend quite what is meant by the distinction. What is
meant is that the objects around us have existence, but not
self-existence, not self-substantiality. That is to say, their
being is not in themselves, their existence is not grounded
in themselves but is grounded in another, and flows from
that other. They exist, but they are not independent ex-
istences. They are rather beings whose being flows into
them from another, which itself is self-existent and self-
substantial. They are, therefore, mere appearances of that