The Economist February 26th 2022 Asia 41F
or thoseconcerned about peace in
the Asia-Pacific region, Ukraine is, as
one Japanese newspaper commentary
puts it, “not a fire on the opposite shore”.
Not least, Asia also has a small democ-
racy bang next to a big bully. China has
long claimed Taiwan as its own, uses its
armed forces to intimidate it and re-
serves the right to invade.
Japan’s prime minister, Kishida Fu-
mio, recently warned, “If we tolerate the
use of force to change the status quo, it
will have an impact on Asia as well.” He
was implying that the aggression of
Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, to-
wards Ukraine could embolden his Chi-
nese counterpart, Xi Jinping, regarding
Taiwan. China’s commentariat does little
to dispel the notion. In response to a g 7
call to support Ukraine’s territorial integ-
rity, the Global Times, a state tabloid,
tweeted mockingly, “When China takes
action to eradicate [the] secessionist
regime in Taiwan, you must also give
China unwavering support.”
In reality, far from affirming the
wisdom of Mr Xi’s foreign policy, the war
in Ukraine exposes its limits (see China
section). Meanwhile, the differences
between Ukraine and Taiwan illuminate
more than do the similarities, starting
with levels of American support. Most
Americans cannot find Ukraine, their
country’s 67th-biggest trading partner,
on a map.
Taiwan, by contrast, is America’s
ninth-largest trading partner and a semi-
conductor superpower at the heart of
global supply chains. As a Chinese-
speaking democracy, points out Bonnie
Glaser of the German Marshall Fund of
the us, a Washington think-tank, Taiwan
has long been valued by the United States
as an alternative political model to the
Communist-run mainland. The twocountries had a mutual-defence treaty
until 1979, since when America has sup-
plied weaponry and said it will resist
forcible attempts to change the island’s
status as an independent nation in all but
name. Taiwan also sits at the nub of the
western Pacific’s “first island chain” and,
under friendly management, offers a
crucial buffer to Japan, America’s main
ally in the region, from Chinese threats.
So American credibility is much more
at stake in Asia over Taiwan than it is in
Europe over Ukraine. Losing Taiwan
would mean the end of a security order in
the region that America has led since the
second world war, and ceding to China the
role of the region’s uncontested power.
It is not surprising, then, that Taiwan’s
president, Tsai Ing-wen, and her adminis-
tration make much of their country’s
differences from Ukraine. Mr Xi, they
argue, knows that America would respond
robustly to any attack. Of greater immedi-
ate concern, says Lo Chih-cheng, head of
the ruling party’s foreign-affairs division,
is that Ukraine will distract American
attention, allowing China to make mil-itary mischief, such as testing Taiwan’s
commitment to defending outlying
islets. Andrew Yang, a Taiwanese former
defence minister, predicts China will
step up misinformation drives and cyb-
er-attacks designed to sow doubt about
American commitments and reinforce a
narrative of the inevitability of Chinese
dominance. Here, a linkage with Ukraine
does exist, Ms Glaser notes: China is
watching closely how Russia applies
hybrid warfare there, with lessons for its
use against Taiwan.
A final linkage is that Russia itself is
an Asian power. Before it began prepar-
ing for war against Ukraine, its military
activities in the Russian Far East were
becoming not only more vigorous but
also more hostile to America and its
friends. Russia uses the Sea of Okhotsk,
north of Japan, as a redoubt for its nuc-
lear-armed submarines (designed to
attack the United States as a last resort).
It has conducted joint naval drills with
China, an increasingly close military
partner, in the Sea of Japan.
Meanwhile, Japan is the only g7 mem-
ber with which Russia has a direct terri-
torial dispute: Stalin seized four north-
ern islands in the last days of the second
world war. Japan’s hopes of their return
have led to years of attempted rapproche-
ment with Russia, in which Japan has
been at pains not to be seen to be part of
an anti-Russia grouping. But this week
Japan has condemned Russia’s aggres-
sion and has joined Western sanctions
on the country—despite unusually large
Russian exercises in waters near Japan in
recent weeks, intended, military analysts
say, to deter Japan from siding with
America and Europe. The heightened
tension between Russia and Japan looks
set to become the norm. Ukraine’s fires
are already burning on the Asian shore.The implications of the war in Ukraine for the Asia-Pacific regionBanyan Fearful symmetry?
The episode in 2012 haunts Cambodia’s
government to this day. It saw this year’s
chairmanship as a chance to “redeem” it-
self, says Elina Noor of the Asia Society
Policy Institute, an American think-tank.
Taking a hard line against the junta would
counter the perception that it was an ally of
authoritarians and the stooge of China,
which has urged aseanto befriend the
generals. Mr Hun Sen, who is 70, may never
chair aseanagain, and so this is one of his
last opportunities to “refashion” his image
on the world stage, says Aaron Connelly of
the International Institute of Strategic
Studies, a think-tank in Singapore.
Yet Mr Hun Sen could not resist making
overtures to the junta. That is because he
sees himself as a peacemaker who helped
bring an end to war in his own country,
says Mr Connelly. Myanmar is proving
trickier, however. On February 17th, just six
weeks into his chairmanship, he an-
nounced he would bequeath the crisis to
his successor to resolve: “I’m damned if I
do, and damned if I don’t, so just let it be.”
For the rest of his chairmanship, Mr
Hun Sen will probably do as his diplomats
suggest and try to distance himself fromChina. Following precedent, Cambodia did
not invite junta officials to an asean re-
treat on February 16th, and hopes to hold
meetings with a rival government com-
posed of deposed lawmakers. Western gov-
ernments will probably shrug. Cambodia
is one of China’s closest allies in the re-
gion. It is Cambodia’s biggest source of aid
and investment, and is helping pay to up-
grade a naval base. Yet Cambodia claims
not to want to choose between America
and China. Now mightbeagood time for
Western countries totestits readiness to
strike a better balance.