280 mind
- See Antoine Lutz and Evan Thompson, “Neurophenomenology: Integrating
Subjective Experience and Brain Dynamics in the Neuroscience of Consciousness,”
Journal of Consciousness Studies10 (2003): 31–52. - See Michael McGee,Transformations of Mind: Philosophy as Spiritual Practice
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). - Varela, Thompson, and Rosch,The Embodied Mind.
- See Arne Johan Vetlesen,Perception, Empathy, and Judgment: An Inquiry into
the Preconditions of Moral Performance(University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1994). - See Edith Stein,On the Problem of Empathy,trans. Waltraut Stein (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1964). - See Stephanie Preston and Frans B. M. de Waal, “Empathy: Its Ultimate and
Proximate Bases,”Behavioral and Brain Sciences25 (2002): 1–72. - Robert W. Levenson and Anna M. Reuf, “Empathy: A Physiological Sub-
strate,”Journal of Personality and Social Psychology63 (1992): 234–246. - See Natalie Depraz, “The Husserlian Theory of Intersubjectivity as Alterology:
Emergent Theories and Wisdom Traditions in the Light of Genetic Phenomenology,”
Journal of Consciousness Studies8.5–7 (2001): 169–178, also printed in Evan Thomp-
son, ed.,Between Ourselves: Second Person Issues in the Study of Consciousness(Thorver-
ton, UK: Imprint Academic, 2001), 169–178. - Edmund Husserl,Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on
Transcendental Logic,trans. Anthony J. Steinbock (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub-
lishers, 2001). - For the distinction between body image and body schema, see Shaun Gal-
lagher, “Body Image and Body Schema: A Conceptual Clarification,”The Journal of
Mind and Behavior7 (1986): 541–554. - Preston and de Waal, “Empathy.”
- G. Buccino, F. Binkofski, G. R. Fink, L. Fadiga, L. Fogassi, V. Gallese, R. J.
Seitz, K. Zilles, G. Rizzolatti, and H. J. Freund, “Action Observation Activates Premo-
tor and Parietal Areas in a Somatotopic Manner: An fMRI Study,”European Journal of
Neuroscience13 (2001): 400–404. - See Frans B. M. de Waal, “On the Possibility of Animal Empathy,” inFeelings
and Emotions: The Amsterdam Symposium, ed. T. Manstead, N. Fridja, and A. Fischer
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). - “Mind reading” seems a poor phrase to describe the fundamental nature of
our intersubjective cognitive abilities. It suggests that we are mainly spectators of
each other, that human social life is based primarily on a spectatorial or observational
ability to “read” inner mental states on the basis of outward behavior (as we read the
meaning of words on the basis of written marks). For criticism of this view, see Victo-
ria McGeer, “Psycho-Practice, Psycho-Theory and the Contrastive Case of Autism,”
Journal of Consciousness Studies8.5–7 (2001): 109–132, also in Evan Thompson,Be-
tween Ourselves, 109–132, and Shaun Gallagher, “The Practice of Mind: Theory, Simu-
lation, or Primary Interaction?”Journal of Consciousness Studies8.5–7 (2001): 83–108,
also in Evan Thompson,Between Ourselves, 83–108. - Frans B. M. de Waal,Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Hu-
mans and Other Animals(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 69.