Paul C. Smith & Kris Vasquez
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Motivated Irrationality
As teachers, we may hold an implicit assumption that people prefer to hold accurate views
about the world over inaccurate views. Though certainly there are situations in all of our
lives in which we act mindlessly or behave in ways that cannot be defended on logical
premises, those who work as educators may be forgiven for assuming that students would
rather learn what the best available evidence says, rather than clinging to erroneous beliefs
for their comfort value. The latter behavior is irrational and maladaptive in the classroom
and often in other areas of life as well. And yet it is common. Why (we might ask, in frus-
tration) would people prefer irrationality to rationality? What purpose would that serve?
One way that such behavior can be understood is through Tetlock’s (2002) social func-
tionalist frameworks. Tetlock’s conception of the “intuitive theologian” is particularly
useful. An intuitive theologian is a framework that exists to protect sacred values, which
are deeply held values endorsed by community consensus. For some people, freedom
may be a sacred value; for others, obeying God’s laws is one. Belief in these values—
which meet the criteria for morality specified earlier—creates a sense of shared identity for
the community. Defending the values against attacks supports the individual’s need for
accountability within the social system. It is important to note that the intuitive theolo-
gian is not concerned with the accuracy of the worldview, only that the members of the
community act in accordance with it.
As one would expect, given the qualities of moral values, violations are a serious matter
to the intuitive theologian. Affectively, the results of a violation are strong and negative
(anger, contempt). Behaviorally, violations result in the urge for symbolic acts to demon-
strate commitment to the value in question. One remarkable finding from Tetlock and
colleagues is that individuals need not act to violate the value; if they even think about
violating it, the affective and behavioral consequences are immediate and severe.
This work suggests that once a class discussion has invoked moral values, students will
find it almost impossible to consider evidence in a rational way, because they are attending
to what are experientially much more pressing demands from their larger social lives. The
need to act consistently with personal religious beliefs, for instance, is a central component
of identity for many American students. To ask them to entertain, even hypothetically, an
argument that they view as a violation of their religious views will leave them angry and
more committed than ever to the views you have challenged. If they live lives outside the
classroom with commitment to these values, they cannot check them at the door, and
would see no value in attempting to do so even if they could. Therefore, critical thinking
will not be in evidence.
Too Many Theologians Derail the Discussion
Dealing with one student whose moral judgment has been invoked is challenging.
Classroom interaction among students when moral issues are in play is even more so.
Skitka, Bauman, and Sargis (2005) found that, compared with students discussing issues
without moral content, students discussing moral issues were less co-operative, expressed