Paul C. Smith & Kris Vasquez
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adopt an analytical attitude in advance of hearing the argument, may be useful (Pizarro &
Bloom, 2003). But if you catch them unprepared, and their first reactions are emotional
ones, it will be exceptionally difficult for them to backtrack and consider the arguments in
a carefully detached way.
Conclusion
It is ironic that the critical thinking skills we attempt to teach to our students seem to fail
where they are needed most, but it is also no accident. Students resist a detached, scientific
evaluation of certain beliefs for compelling reasons, including the need to preserve common-
sense epistemology and social accountability. We believe that without careful attention to
the conditions that promote this resistance, our goal of increasing critical thinking will be
difficult to achieve. However, despite the challenges outlined here, we also believe that it is
possible to make progress, even in the face of immovable objects and irresistible forces.
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