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(Steven Felgate) #1
Defamation 259

(i) Where it is clearly and unambiguously imputed that the claimant has committed an
imprisonable crime.


(ii) If it damages the reputation of the claimant in any office, profession, calling, trade or
business held by the claimant at the time of publication.


(iii) If it imputes that the claimant is currently suffering from a contagious disease to which
a stigma is attached.


(iv) If it imputes that a woman is not chaste or has committed adultery.


The last two of these exceptions are in modern times of much reduced significance.


Remoteness of damage


Where it is necessary to prove actual damage the Wagon Moundtest on remoteness of
damage applies. Therefore, the claimant can claim only for a type of loss which was a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s act.


Defences


Consent of the claimant


A claimant who consented to the publication, expressly or impliedly, cannot sue for
defamation.


Justification


It is a complete defence for the defendant to prove that the statement was true. This is the
case even if the statement was made maliciously.


Innocent publication


Section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996 provides a defence to a distributor, who was not
the author, editor or publisher of the defamatory statement, if he took reasonable care
in relation to its publication and did not have reason to believe that his actions caused or
contributed to the publication of the defamatory matter. For the purposes of s. 1 of the Act,
organisations which sell access to the Internet are not ‘publishers’ of material posted on the
Internet by their customers.


Godfrey vDemon Internet Ltd (2001)

The defendants, Internet service providers, received and stored on their news server
an article which defamed the claimant. The defendants did not know who had posted the
article. The claimants told the defendants that the article was defamatory and asked them
to remove it. The defendants did not remove the article and so it remained on the Internet
until it automatically expired ten days later. When sued for libel, the defendants relied on
s. 1 of the Defamation Act 1996.
HeldThe defence was not available because once the defendants had been informed of
the defamatory material, and had chosen not to remove it, they could no longer claim that
they had taken all reasonable care in relation to the publication. Nor could they claim that
their actions did not cause or contribute to the defamatory matter.
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