Keshavarzian 219standing and middle class sensibilities made for a population in contact
with multiple urban publics and ideologies, such as nationalism, repub-
licanism, and leftist and Islamist politics. Thus, they mobilized or were
mobilized by others. In addition, the locale of the bazaar facilitated col-
lective action through copresence. As a pedestrian area lined with public
gathering places (coffee houses, mosques, and open squares) near gov-
ernment establishments, the Tehran bazaar was a ready-made space for
public gathering and political demonstration. Word of political issues and
activities could spread quickly through the bazaar.
e strong sense of solidarity and social policing of the boundary Th
between bazaaris and non-bazaaris was important for two reasons. First,
it helped limit the ability of the Shah’s secret police (SAVAK) to pene-
trate the bazaar, since bazaaris were quick to identify outside agents and
suspicious behavior.^47 Second, the bazaaris were able to effectively sanc-
tion those members who were hesitant to participate in collective action.
For example, closures very often worked through peer pressure. When
the Society of Merchants, Guilds, and Artisans called for strikes, those
store owners that did not close in the morning closed in the afternoon.^48
Consider the statement of a shop owner in Amiriyeh, a quarter near the
bazaar, explaining why he placed a picture of Khomeini in his shop win-
dow to prevent attacks against his store: “Most people want an Islamic
republic ... And I want anything that most of the people want.”^49 During
the protests, space and active networks enabled bazaaris to identify,
shame, and coerce non-participants and helped committed rebels reduce
free-riding by cajoling and threatening unenthusiastic shopkeepers.
The withering of publicness under the Islamic Republic
During the prerevolutionary era networks were largely maintained
within the physical space and social milieu of the covered marketplace
and its immediate environs. The present situation is radically different.
Commercial networks and many individual relations now transcend
not only the state-bazaar divide but also national borders and center-
periphery relations. Since the revolution, the Islamic Republic has created
commercial circuits dominated by and dependent on state institutions