Keshavarzian 223with Turkey and Azerbaijan. These are in a sense a revitalization of his-
toric patterns of socioeconomic relations, ones that predate the modern
creation of a centralized nation-state in Tehran.
owering the bazaar’s position in the hierarchies of the postrevo-L
lutionary political economy has introduced fissures within the bazaari
community. Prior to the Islamic Revolution, commercial power accrued
from one’s position in the hierarchy, good reputation, and contacts within
the bazaar’s networks. As already suggested, this is no longer the case.
Beyond contacts in Dubai, access to state resources and elites is the main
source of commercial opportunity and status. Thus over time a distinc-
tion has emerged between those who have “remained in the bazaar” and
managed to continue their trade in some form or another, and those who
have benefited from kinship and political affiliations with the postrevo-
lutionary state elite, who enjoy rents via exclusive importing licenses, tax
exemptions, subsidized hard currency, and control over procurement
boards and industrial establishments. The bazaaris who have established
patronage channels have used them for personal and exclusive ends, not
as a tool for the benefit of the bazaar as a corporate entity. The traders
who from the outset developed intimate relations with state organiza-
tions and even took positions in ministries and parastatal organizations
are no longer viewed as bazaari; despite their family roots in the bazaar
they are referred to as dowlatῑ or members of the state. Even high-pro-
file families that operate both in political and economic spheres, like the
Asgarowladis, Khamoushis, Rafiqdousts, and Hajj-Tarkhanis lose their
status among bazaaris, because their power and ability to engage in com-
mercial activities stems from their privileged position in the new political
system, rather than from their roots in the bazaar’s system.
s the relationships of the Tehran bazaar to the commercial A
economy, the postrevolutionary state, and the process of urbanization
have changed, it is not surprising that the bazaar’s physical space and
its social relations have also been transformed. Commercial activities
and exchanges take place as much outside Tehran as they do within the
bazaar; and while still based on personal relations, they radiate across sev-
eral locations that typically do not lend themselves to crosscutting ties
or multifaceted relations. Additionally, given the illegal or exclusionary
nature of the arrangements, meetings and conversations with smugglers,