332 Mediated Publics
journalism is concerned, the past quarter century could at first
sight be seen as a continuation of the same pattern, with two
short periods of rapid growth, in 1979–1980 and 1997–2000,
each described as a “Spring of Freedom,” and each followed
by the closure of large numbers of newspapers by the state ...
Quantitatively, by the end of 2004, Iran had more than 1200
newspapers and more than 5000 men and women working as
professional journalists.^16ven the “Spring of Freedom” under Khatami did not allow for the E
emergence of a real and permanent public sphere in Iran. Yet this period
was long enough to give Iranians the taste of freedom of expression: some
political borders were trespassed and taboos on criticism of presidents
and other politicians (but still not religious authorities) were broken.
Today, despite new types of repression and the support that Ahmadinejad
receives from the Supreme Leader, he is the most criticized president in
recent Iranian history.
ndeed, despite greater control and heavier newspaper censor-I
ship, the expansion of satellite TV and new media technology has meant
that this censorship has not had the same effect as it did during the first
years of the revolution or even during the period when reformists were
in power. In fact, opposition inside the Islamic Republic is much stron-
ger. For instance, one of the most critical newspapers in Iran today,
‘Etimād, belonged to reformists and supporters of Khatami; ‘Etimād-e
Mellῑ^ belonged to the Ayatollah Karubi, Ahmadinejad’s rival for the presi-
dency in 2005^17 ; the news Web site Tābnāk (formerly Bāztab) belongs to
Mohsen Rezai,^18 the former commander of the army. And recently, the
news Web site “Alef,” which belongs to a fundamentalist deputy in the
Eighth Parliament, Ahmad Tavakoli, was the first to denounce Interior
Minister Ali Kordan’s fake academic degree.^19
n 2006, the Web site I Bāztab, which belongs to the former com-
mander of the Guardian Islamic Revolution’s Army (Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e
Enqelqb-e Eslāmῑ) and is critical of Ahmadinejad’s policies, was blocked,
but later it was republished under the new name Tābnāk due to Rezai’s
influence and also to the solidarity displayed by some Iranian Web sites
and weblogs, which do not miss any opportunity to protest state filtering
of cyberspace.