Publics, Politics and Participation

(Wang) #1
Alagha 461

Phase II: Infitāh.


As the 1990s unfolded, Hizbullah continued to promote its Islamic iden-
tity and agenda, now however following a pragmatic political program and
gradually integrating into the public sphere. Hizbullah remained faithful
to its Shi‘i constituency by establishing Islamic institutions within civil
society while at the same time working within the Lebanese state’s politi-
cal and administrative structures to promote Islamization. Religious capi-
tal within its constituency was consolidated when Ayatollah Khamina’i,
the supreme leader of Iran, named Nasrallah and Muhammad Yazbik^11 as
his wakῑlayn shar‘iyyān [religious deputies in Lebanon]. Broader politi-
cal capital was gained with the inclusion of Sunnis and Christians on
Hizbullah’s electoral ballots. And symbolic capital was advanced with fur-
ther disassociation from Islamic Jihad. Hizbullah earned social and eco-
nomic capital with the Sunni and Christian grassroots through the ser-
vices provided by its non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
izbullah employed the term H infitāh. [opening up] to signify its
entry into Lebanese national political life. Infitāh. is a policy of open dia-
logue in a pluralistic setting through interaction and cooperation with
all the sects and communities that comprise the Lebanese polity in order
to solve political and social problems, foster national unity, and build a
stronger and united Lebanon on shared common ground. This change
in Hizbullah’s strategy is linked to the Ta’if Agreement of 1989 that con-
cluded the civil war in Lebanon and established a new constitution. The
new constitution specified the Christian and Muslim sharing of political
office on a 50-50 basis, most notably in the legislature and cabinet, and
also stripped the president of most of his powers, transferring them to
the cabinet.
e Ta’if Agreement also stipulated the disbanding of all militias and Th
the surrender of their weapons to the Lebanese state. It called for the inte-
gration of the militia members into Lebanese civil society and Lebanese
state institutions, most prominently the Lebanese Army. This allowed the
militias to transform themselves into full-fledged political parties. Since
the Lebanese government classified Hizbullah as a resistance movement
rather than a militia, it granted the group permission to maintain its arms
and continue in its role of confronting the Israeli occupation in the south.

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