466 Resisting Publics
two main political groups. The “8 March Group”—comprising Hizbullah,
Amal, and other pro-Syrian groups, the majority of which are Shi‘i—orga-
nized a demonstration in support of Syria. The other group, known as
the “Cedar Revolution” or “14 March Trend,”^24 responded with a demon-
stration of an estimated one million people in downtown Beirut—spear-
headed by “Future Trend,” the majority of whom are Sunni—to demand
the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanese soil and the truth about
Hariri’s assassination. Under pressure from the street, as well as interna-
tional pressure in the form of United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
Resolution 1559, Syria withdrew from Lebanon on 26 April 2005, after
a presence of twenty-nine years.^25 While the 14 March group hoped for
Syrian influence to then wane in Lebanon, Hizbullah’s strategic-political
relationship with the Syrian regime remained strong.^26
izbullah concedes that the Syrian withdrawal hastened the party’s H
increased participation in Lebanese politics and state institutions and its
decision to join the cabinet. Previously, it had resolved not to join the cab-
inet as long as the Syrians were in Lebanon since their presence accorded
Hizbullah political patronage and indirect influence at the highest levels
of government. With the departure of the Syrians, Hizbullah felt that the
Lebanese cabinet would be faced with political and strategic choices that
would have grave consequences for Lebanon’s future^27 and deemed it nec-
essary to seek representation in the cabinet so as to directly influence its
policy statements and implementations.^28
lthough the watershed decision to participate in the Lebanese A
cabinet should have required a shari‘a judgment and legitimization by
the faqῑh, Hizbullah set a precedent by securing legitimacy from a local
Lebanese cleric, Shaykh ‘Afif al-Nabulsi,^29 and not Ayatollah Khamina’i.^30
Although this suggests that the party was now heeding a Lebanese reli-
gious authority in addition to the Iranian one, Hizbullah regarded its
participation in the Lebanese cabinet as an administrative matter on
which Hizbullah’s leadership was able to take an independent stand. Thus,
Hizbullah was shifting from its 1980s strategy of complete ideological
dependency on Iran to more independence in decision-making, not only
in practical political issues, but also in at least some doctrinal issues.
n the first parliamentary elections after the Syrian withdrawal, from I
29 May to 19 June 2005, Hizbullah competed on the basis of a temporary