468 Resisting Publics
ultimately for a period of seven weeks. Only after Prime Minister Sanyura
reiterated Hizbullah’s right to resist the Israeli occupation (in the Sheb‘a
farms) did the five ministers reassume their duties.
nother incident took place on 5 February 2006, one day after the A
torching of the Danish Embassy in Damascus as a protest against the
publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed in a manner
found offensive by many Muslims. Mobs of Muslims attempted to set the
Danish Embassy, in a Christian East Beirut neighborhood, on fire. Chaos
broke out, and many shops, cars, and churches were vandalized. Lebanese
security forces failed to establish order, and as a result the minister of the
interior later resigned and the Lebanese government offered Denmark a
formal apology.
n order to contain negative repercussions and prevent the escalation I
of Christian-Muslim discord, not to say civil unrest, the next day General
Michel ‘Auon, the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), and
Nasrallah met in a church across the old “green line” (demarcating the line
between primarily Muslim and Christian neighborhoods and factions dur-
ing the civil war) and signed a historic ten-point “Understanding” address-
ing political, economic, administrative, and security issues, as well as rela-
tions with Syria. The Understanding also dealt with domestic concerns,
such as administrative reform, election law, corruption, and investigations
into the Hariri murder.^34 Interestingly, Article 7 of the Understanding,
entitled “Lebanese-Syrian Relations,” suggested four measures to ward off
“foreign tutelage,” including demarcating the borders between Lebanon
and Syria,^35 revealing the fates of Lebanese detainees in Syrian prisons, and
establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. It is worth
mentioning that the foregoing points corresponded to the demands of the
Maronite Church as well as the defunct Christian opposition group Qrnet
Shahwan.^36 Furthermore, they reflected the demands of the 14 March
movement, and thus the alliance between Hizbullah and the FPM weak-
ened and split the 14 March ranks. Although the majority of 14 March
Trend members were still Sunni and those of 8 March Group were still
Shi‘i, the temporary four-partite alliance formed for the purpose of the
elections had been dissolved, and following the Understanding, the FPM
shifted its support to 8 March Group. This escalated tensions and gener-
ated confrontations between the 14 March and 8 March blocs.^37